While such initiatives are always welcome, they are particularly welcome now, at a time when, due to climate change, some of the highest temperatures globally have been recorded for several days in this district and nearby areas recently.

Recently, on June 28, a tree plantation event was organized in this village, which is to be followed up with further planting of about 1000 trees spread over 5 to 6 acres. Arrangements for the protection of the planted trees are being made. This is being called a virasat van or heritage forest, so that the site abandoned by the people of Maanpur does not remain dusty land but instead becomes a heritage of a beautiful forest, including trees that provide fresh air, conserve water, and yield fruits. It is hoped that once this becomes a dense forest, it will in the future provide at least some protection from floods.

On the sidelines of the main tree-planting event, I spoke to some villagers regarding their problems. They said that although they shifted to a new place, proper cultivation still remains a problem as much more land-levelling work remains to be done. The government should provide much more help for this, they said, as the small, low-resource farmers here certainly cannot afford to take this up on their own.

Another problem they face is from the large-scale sand mining in the Ken River, as the river’s flow is disrupted by this, and the water table in the village goes down, creating problems for farmers. People here said that even more harm has been suffered by other communities, like the \Kewats\, who were cultivating vegetables on the river bank and later exchanging their produce with wheat from Maanpur and other villages. who were cultivating vegetables on river bank and later exchanging their vegetable with wheat produced in Maanpur and other villages. The dust and unhealthy conditions created by large-scale mining are also troublesome. In addition, there is an adverse impact on fish and other river life. Some years back, there was a movement against indiscriminate and excessive sand mining in the river in the main village of Kolawalpur, which was joined by several neighboring settlements.

The resettled villagers of Maanpur also want better access to education and other essential facilities. The drop-out rate is higher for older children/higher grades as people find it unsafe to send children to the upper school located at some distance. In particular, the education of girls is disrupted more due to this.

There are also problems relating to this being a border village, located very close to the Madhya Pradesh state border.

The village \panchayat\ here has a good record of encouraging development work, but its resources must be increased, keeping in view the special needs of a resettled village. The government must also directly contribute to its welfare and development needs, recognizing the unique challenges of a village that has been resettled, people here said.

Gaya Prasad Gopal is one of the most senior and respected social activists of Bundelkhand regionBundelkhandA geographical and cultural region and also a proposed state in central India, divided between the states of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. It is known for its historical significance and often faces developmental challenges.. Several other prominent activists doing commendable work in this region and elsewhere started their journey with Gopal Ji, as friends often call him. At a time when land reforms were being increasingly forgotten, he kindled a new hope by leading a campaign that resulted in the availability of farmland to nearly 2500 landless households, mostly from tribal/DalitDalitA term for members of the lowest castes in India, formerly known as ‘untouchables’. They have historically faced severe discrimination and socio-economic disadvantages. communities. He has taken forward important initiatives relating to water conservation, minor irrigation, afforestation, rural education and protection of folk arts. Gopal has also been involved in several state level and national level efforts to improve and strengthen the contributions of voluntary organizations.

When I went recently to meet him at his residence in Chitrakut, the 88 year old activist who still takes a keen interest in social issues said, “The biggest source of strength for me in my six decades as a social activist has been my wife Ram Kumari who has stood steadfastly with me through numerous difficult times and crisis situations.”

Gopal’s early memories are of a child in Bigahna village who faced considerable difficulties in his education due to poverty. However, his commitment to studying was noted by his teachers, who encouraged him. His sweet reciting of \Ramcharitmanas\ endeared him to elderly women, who were very affectionate towards the child and tried to help with his education. endeared him to elderly women who were very affectionate towards the child and tried to help his education. A childhood friendship became so strong that Gopal’s friend from a prosperous family insisted on taking him to his own school and then deliberately failed himself for one year so that the two friends could be together in the same class.

With such friends, the leadership qualities of Gopal started flowering at an early age. When some influential villagers did not allow a wrongly stigmatized woman to restore a water source as her contribution to village welfare, Gopal stepped out to lead village youth to renovate this well. (I wrote a Hindi short story \Gutti Dai ka Kuan\, based on this real-life incident, which was widely appreciated). They together completed this task despite stiff opposition from some influential persons.

With an offer for teaching in a town Atarra, Gopal and Ram Kumari moved there and soon Gopal beat up a goon known for harassing others. The goon assembled his friends to attack the residence of Gopal at night. Both Gopal and Ram Kumari emerged together with stout sticks and dared the goons to attack. The goons preferred to lurk away.

Soon, a job offer came from a development organization. This brought Gopal into contact with the poorest rural households of Patha or plateau regionPatha RegionA specific plateau area, often characterized by rugged terrain and remote villages, within the Bundelkhand region of India, known for its challenging socio-economic conditions and historical issues like dacoity. on the one hand and several senior officials on the other hand. Some of these officials recognized his talent and encouraged him to register his own NGO which he did under the name of ABSSS (Akhil Bhartiya Samaj Seva Sansthaan).

The Patha region was dominated by landlords several of whom had illegally occupied land that was distributed among the poorest households by the government. Many of the landless, meanwhile, continued to toil more or less as their bonded workers, not even aware of the precise location of the land given to them by the government. There were several dacoit gangs in the region, some having contacts with big landlords, which made it even more difficult to oppose the exploitative system.

Earlier, while working for another NGO, Gopal had won widespread admiration for the nicely implemented food-for-work program and other relief programs. But wandering in these hills and forests, he often wondered if any durable benefits could reach the poorest without securing land or fighting off bonded labor conditions.

So, when ABSSS started, Gopal gave top priority to land and labor issues, despite all the risks involved. After initial denials by the administration, the reality of bonded labor was recognized, and significant release and rehabilitation efforts were initiated. The land rights campaign continued for several years in stages, in the course of which nearly 2500 households could get their land securely after proper measurement and demarcation.

The next challenge was how to facilitate cultivation, as many remotely located plots lacked access to irrigation. Here too Gopal and his colleagues worked hard to implement several water conservation and minor irrigation projects, followed by bigger watershed projects, These provide a very good example of achieving significant results with low budgets, and their contribution was also recognized with prestigious awards.

Gopal was keen to recognize the importance of education and started several non-formal schools in the poorest hamlets. This helped create conditions in which several children could soon join mainstream schools and also subsequently pursue higher education. Even at his present age, he holds educational camps for several of these students. Several students and teachers of these schools, as well as young activists of ABSSS, went on to win \Panchayati Raj\ (rural decentralization) elections and occupy important social positions.

Gopal has written many poems and songs; he is also a great singer and devoted to music. His understanding of folk arts and deep sympathy for folk artists led him on a new journey of organizing folk art festivals and helping folk artists.

Gopal has a passion for trees and for taking up and encouraging afforestation work. He estimates that over a hundred thousand trees have been planted with a very good survival rate as a result of these efforts, and this journey is still continuing. He also takes a keen interest in medicinal plants and their healing qualities.

In the course of his journey of nearly six decades as a development activist, Gopal has done a lot of thinking on evolving an alternative development path. In his thinking, land for the landless, natural and low-cost farming, small irrigation projects, water conservation, afforestation based on indigenous trees, and education based on proper values all have a very important role. At the same time, he firmly opposes the increasing destruction of the environment and the spread of alcoholism and other intoxicants, as these two trends can undo the other gains of recent times, he says. He is particularly concerned about protecting rivers.

My long conversation with Gopal and Ram Kumari was mostly a memory of happy things and good achievements. However tears suddenly appeared in their eyes when two recent great tragedies were discussed. First, their son-in-law, Bhagwat Prasad, who had also made a very important contribution to ABSSS, suddenly died due to a heart attack. Soon after this, their daughter Kanchan, who was perhaps their dearest child, died even more suddenly in a hit-and-run road accident. These two tragedies affected both of them very adversely, but they are slowly trying to emerge from this, and we can only wish them more strength in this effort.

Before we come to these frightening possibilities, however, let me state at the outset that this was a completely avoidable war and there is no reason why Ukraine and Russia could not have lived forever in a durable relationship of friendship and peace, with Ukraine remaining neutral in its relations with Russia and the west, benefiting from both sides.

However, this was not to be, as some powerful forces wanted a proxy war. So here we are now in a war that has already lasted longer than the First World War, claimed a million lives, and displaced about 10 million people externally and internally. This war has been extremely tragic and was completely avoidable, or else could have stopped in four weeks instead of continuing for four years, but perhaps an even bigger question now is whether this can escalate into an even much bigger tragedy.

Here we pose this question in the form of four sub-questions.

The drone and other air attacks have been getting more and more dangerous and there is also the added danger that when there are so frequent attacks, sometimes these can hit very sensitive targets, even unintended or untargeted ones, leading to eruption of sudden crisis. In the case of the attacks on Russia, it is widely recognized that the attacks are facilitated in several ways—help relating to technology, intelligence, expertise, financial help, supplies, etc.—by leading western countries. At one stage, such help was coming more from the USA, and at another stage, it was coming more from leading European countries. In more recent times, times the role of some European countries has been more discussed, together with some unhelpful and aggressive statements from some of their prominent leaders. Unlike in Cold War years years, some serious concerns and red lines of Russia are not getting due attention. This has led to increasing discussion in Russia that there is a wider war or war effort against Russia, and so, at some stage Russia must unleash an attack on at least one European country (or two) that appears to have been the most involved in helping Ukraine’s drone, missile, or other attacks on Russia. Initially, it is likely to be a conventional weapon attack, but a strong one. So our question is: Is such an attack likely, and if so, when and at what stage? I think such an attack becomes more likely when Russia faces a more adverse situation, when its feelings of an existential crisis become stronger, or when an extremely sensitive target gets hit (which may even be unintended, who knows). In such a situation, it is increasingly likely that Russia will launch a strong conventional weapon attackConventional WeaponsWeapons that are not weapons of mass destruction (e.g., nuclear, biological, chemical). They include firearms, artillery, tanks, aircraft, and ships. on one or two European adversaries that are identified as having troubled Russia the most.

Our second question is: What happens after this first attack by Russia? It is certain that the country or countries hit will be NATO members, and this would be the first time Russia would be attacking a NATO member country (if this happens). There has been nothing like this before. So anything can happen. However, given the catastrophic consequences of an all-out war, it is quite likely that efforts for de-escalation will be initiated soon. President Trump may see this as his ultimate Nobel Peace PrizeNobel Peace PrizeOne of the five Nobel Prizes established by the will of Alfred Nobel, awarded to the person who ‘shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses’. opportunity and intervene. So, I think that some de-escalation efforts will certainly be made and recourse to all-out war will be avoided. On the other hand, it is likely that while NATO may not declare war, the country that has been hit may give at least a proportionate response by attacking Russia, with or without the help of an ally.

Our third question is: What happens when Russia is also hit by the country or countries it attacked? If its first attack has not succeeded in its aim, merely led to almost equal exchange of conventional weapons, it is possible that at this stage Russia may respond with a bigger attack or even a nuclear weapon attackNuclear WeaponsExplosive devices that derive their destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission (atomic bomb) or a combination of fission and fusion (thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb).. This is something that sounds unbelievable to many people, but it is a possibility that has been increasingly discussed in recent times, and more people should know this.

Our fourth question is: What can happen after this? It is too frightful to imagine. A Russia vs. NATO nuclear war can destroy the entire world through its direct and indirect impacts. However, it is also possible that saner counsel emerges just before we reach a stage of all-out destruction and an all-out nuclear war and a world war are avoided. On the other hand, it is also a possibility that World War 3 and a nuclear war actually break out, and even if this war remains confined to a few countries and ends in a very few days, its indirect impacts could destroy life in a very large part of the world. I think that if the possibility of this ever happening was considered to be only 5% a few years back, in recent times, judging from very stupid and dangerous statements and actions of some top leaders of our deeply troubled and misguided world, the possibility of this happening has already increased to about 15% or so. Such a high probability for mass destruction is unacceptable, and all forces of peace, restraint, and safety must make maximum efforts now to ensure that such possibilities of all-out destruction cease to exist, starting with a very early end to the Ukraine-Russia war on a note of durable peace. This writer has repeatedly presented a framework for achieving such peace: immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of instigators, followed by negotiations later in conditions of goodwill to resolve all contentious issues.

Bhartendu came from a rural background, and his higher education and research in Allahabad University and IIT Kanpur had been supported by scholarships. He had already worked with highly reputed chemistry scientists at a young age, and a promising career beckoned.

Finally, he discussed all matters in detail with Shobhna and the young couple moved with their daughterer close to the ancestral village (Terahimaafi, in Banda district, UP, a part of BundelkhandBundelkhand RegionA geographical and cultural region in central India, divided between the states of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, known for its historical significance and often facing challenges like water scarcity. region) of Bhartendu. While they had wider plans, the most immediate assignment taken up in Atarra, a small town surrounded by paddy fields, was also promising. This was to take forward the research of Dr. P.C. Kapur at IIT Kanpur on making cement from paddy husk. Bhartendu accepted the challenge of using this technology in actual village conditions. He achieved considerable success. Looking back at this experience, he says that there was promising scope for combining livelihood support with environmental protection, but established industries did not want this to emerge as a serious alternative. However this technology still retains its relevance, he says.

Both Bhartendu and Shobhna had a keen interest in exploring more creative aspects of school-level education, particularly science education. They helped to set up and improve some educational institutions. One very important institution they created was Vigyan Shiksha Kendra (VSK, translated as Science Education Centre) in 1974, which has remained active despite numerous challenges and experiences. Several young activists received their first training here, and later I found several of them playing important roles in various parts of Bundelkhand.

With the help of NCERT, the young couple started a school science program to popularize science teaching based on learning by doing in villages. They also took up a program of documenting village-based traditional technologies in various sectors. VSK soon became an important place for rural development-related training, including training of trainers (TOT). Their work on khadiKhadiA hand-spun and hand-woven natural fiber cloth, primarily cotton, promoted by Mahatma Gandhi as a symbol of self-reliance and rural employment in India. and handlooms was in accordance with their respect for Gandhian ideas, and they also made an important contribution to the promotion of organic farming and other activities at Gandhi ashram in Chhatarpur and elsewhere.

Among various issues that interested them, three emerged as high priority areas—organic farming, medicinal plants, and village-level food processing for livelihood support and healthier food. Apart from working on these issues at the local level, Bhartendu and Shobhna, particularly the former, started increasing participation in these concerns at the national and regional levels. Thus Bhartendu was elected twice elected President of a national organization for promoting rich indigenous traditions of health and healing called Lok Swasthya Parampara Samvardhan Samiti. He was Director of the Organic Farming Association of India (North India) during 2008-2012. Very few people remember today that Dr. Bhartendu Prakash was also the President of the first executive committee of the Centre for Science and Environment, which has become a very big and famous organization today. He made an important contribution to the planning of Gramodaya University in Chitrakut.

Subsequently, while working with OxfamOxfam InternationalA confederation of 21 independent charitable organizations focusing on the alleviation of global poverty and injustice. and some other organizations VSK was more involved with several justice-based issues and legal aid for the weaker sections, as well as providing help to flood victims. VSK was increasingly involved in the issue of floods and droughts in the Bundelkhand region, as well as the water scarcity experienced almost every year in many villages here. This led to a very important study involving several top experts on the Problems and Potential of Water Resources in Bundelkhand Region, brought out in collaboration with IIT Delhi. The growing fame of the work of VSK led to several visitors from abroad coming here to learn about various aspects of its work, while Bhartendu and Shobhna also attended several international conferences and get-togethers. Throughout this time, they were also bringing together several publications related to their work, some of which still remain an important reference source. Bhartendu also published two books of his deeply sensitive Hindi poetry.

In 2008, Bhartendu and Shobhna took an important step of setting up a new regional research center by forming the Bundelkhand Resource Study Centre. Around the same time, Dr. Bhartendu Prakash received the Vikram Sarabhai fellowship from the Madhya Pradesh Council of Science and Technology, Bhopal. This work involved their move from Banda district (Uttar Pradesh) to Chhatarpur district (Madhya Pradesh). Since then they have been spending more time here, while maintaining links with the Banda establishment they created over the years and also occasionally visiting the families of their son and daughter in and around Delhi.

The work taken up under the Vikram Sarabhai fellowship, building further on the earlier study done in cooperation with IIT Delhi, has been of great significance as it leads to an alternative path for ensuring water security and adequacy sustainably for Bundelkhand region. This path combines traditional wisdom with modern science, and emphasizes the protection of natural resources, avoiding indiscriminate exploitation, and steering clear of highly flawed projects.

Dr. Bhartendu, who is 82 now, has increasingly faced health problems but carries on bravely with his never-ending study and research, helped in a big way by the constant, helpful efforts of Shobhna. As I recently travelled to their home to spend a quiet day with them, I realized in the course of these conversations what a great source of strength Shobhna has been to these tireless efforts over the past five decades.

Shobhna told me a very interesting aspect of their life—they have never quarreled in their over 55 years of married life! Of course they have differences from time to time but, as Shobhna says, it is important not to have an argument immediately and allow some time for better understanding and then have a mature discussion.

Shobhna related that at times they had no funds for essential family needs but somehow they could overcome such difficulties.

May their good work for the cause of village science and genuine development continue for many more years!

The most disturbing part of this report is the rising share of farm labourers among those taking their own lives. Of the total 10,546 farming-related deaths, as many as 5,913 — a full 56 per cent — were landless agricultural labourers with no land of their own; this is the second-highest such share in the past five years. In 2020, this share stood at barely 47.5 per cent, and it has climbed steadily since, particularly after 2021. By contrast, the suicide rate among farmers who actually cultivate their own land had been declining in recent years, but 2024 saw a slight uptick; the share of cultivators among total agricultural suicides rose from 43.5 per cent in 2023 to nearly 44 per cent. This shift is not merely a play of numbers but a reflection of a fundamental transformation underway in the structure of rural India’s incomes. According to NABARDNational Bank for Agriculture and Rural DevelopmentAn apex development financial institution in India, focused on rural development and agricultural credit.‘s All India Rural Financial Inclusion Survey, the share of farm income in total household income fell from 49 per cent in 2012-13 to 37.70 per cent by 2018-19, while over the same period the share of income from wage labour rose from 32 per cent to 40 per cent. In other words, income from one’s own land is shrinking, and families are increasingly forced to make ends meet by labouring on someone else’s fields. This class—having lost their land or never having owned any—falls outside every social safety net: they receive no crop insurance, no benefit from loan waivers, and when a season fails, there is no work left for their hands. That, in essence, is the real tragedy.

Looking at the state-wise figures, Maharashtra’s situation is once again bleak. In 2024, the state recorded 3,824 suicides among farmers and farm labourers, accounting for 36.5 per cent of the country’s total agricultural suicides — meaning one in every three such deaths in India occurred in Maharashtra. While the NCRB report does not record the precise causes behind these suicides, it is not hard to draw a connection with the record of climate disasters. In 2024, extreme weather events such as heavy rainfall and floods affected more than 20,37,000 hectares of crop area in the state, nearly half of the 40,72,000 hectares affected by such events nationwide. Karnataka follows Maharashtra, with 2,971 deaths recorded, and among the larger states it also saw the sharpest rise—a jump of 22.5 per cent over 2023. Madhya Pradesh recorded 835 deaths, a rise of 7.25 per cent; while Rajasthan too saw an increase of around 14 per cent. In contrast, Andhra Pradesh, which ranks fourth with 780 suicides, saw its figure fall by more than 15 per cent compared to the previous year—a reminder of just how uneven the regional character of this crisis is. Tamil Nadu recorded 503 deaths and Chhattisgarh 486. Among the union territories, the figures from Puducherry proved the most alarming: between 2019 and 2022 not a single agricultural suicide had been recorded there, but ten cases emerged in 2023, and by 2024 that number had jumped straight to thirty-three — a rise of 230 per cent in a single year, and every one of these victims was a farm labourer.

The situation in a large, densely populated agrarian state like Uttar Pradesh also emerges from this report. Although its absolute numbers remain lower than those of Maharashtra, Karnataka, or Madhya Pradesh, the pace of increase there is striking; even as the share of livelihoods based on farm labour grows within the rural economy, suicides among farm labourers there too have been rising sharply. This is not an isolated example limited to one state, but an indication that a crisis traditionally seen as confined to southern and western Indian states such as Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh is now raising its head just as seriously in the states of northern and central India. Looking at the trend over the past five years, fourteen states have recorded a rise in agricultural suicides, and in thirteen states the number of suicides among farm labourers has now overtaken that among actual cultivating farmers; in 2019, only nine states fell into this category. This means the agrarian crisis is no longer confined to landowning farmers alone, but is shifting toward the most vulnerable class — those without land, surviving on daily wages.

Looking at today’s figures, one must not forget that India’s agrarian suicide crisis carries a history stretching back nearly three decades. According to a twenty-eight-year analysis by the Centre for Science and Environment, a total of 3,94,206 farmers and farm labourers took their own lives across the country between 1995 and 2023—an average of more than 13,600 lives lost every year. This analysis notes that after India joined the World Trade Organization in 1995, subsidies on farming declined and rising imports weakened the incomes of small and marginal farmers. Around the same period, Bt cottonBacillus thuringiensis cottonA genetically modified organism (GMO) cotton variety that produces an insecticide to combat bollworm pests, widely adopted in India. spread rapidly; but this technology, which promised higher yields and protection from pests, did not prove as effective as expected. Instead, the cost of seeds and inputs rose, financial risk increased, and in the absence of guaranteed prices, many small farmers found themselves trapped in a cycle of debt. Between 2000 and 2009, more than 1,54,000 suicides were recorded nationwide, and 2002 proved the most devastating year, when 17,971 farmers lost their lives in that single year alone. The suicide rate in Maharashtra and Karnataka has remained consistently around two and a half times the national average since the mid-1990s. Southern and western India together accounted for about 72.5 per cent of all agricultural suicides recorded since 1995, while Andhra Pradesh and Telangana alone have recorded more than 1,70,000 deaths over these twenty-eight years.

Interventions such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee SchemeMGNREGS (or MGNREGA)An Indian labour law and social security measure that aims to guarantee the ‘right to work’ by providing at least 100/125 days of wage employment in a financial year to every rural household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work. played an important role in reining in this long-standing crisis to some extent, and the suicide graph in many states began trending downward after 2010. In Kerala, a figure of 1,118 recorded in 2005 fell to a mere 105 by 2014. In West Bengal, agricultural suicide records fell to zero by 2012, and Madhya Pradesh too saw a notable decline during this period. But in states like Maharashtra and Karnataka, where rain-dependent farming and market-dependent cash crops such as cotton and sugarcane are still cultivated on a large scale, the suicide rate remained high even after these welfare schemes were introduced—pointing to the limits of short-term relief and the absence of deeper agricultural reform. And now, since 2023, this declining graph appears to be climbing upward once again, particularly in the case of farm labourers.

Research directly linking the unpredictability of rainfall to these suicides has also become quite robust by now. Researchers studying year-wise data from 2014-15 to 2020-21 across five states — Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Telangana — have found that in years with a greater rainfall deficit, the rate of farmer suicides also rises correspondingly. In Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh, 62, 44, and 76 per cent of land respectively is classified as drought-prone, and it is in these very states that farmer suicide rates have consistently remained high.

One aspect of this crisis is that official data does not always present the complete picture of reality. There is often a stark gap between the figures collected by various state governments and district administrations and those reported to the NCRB. In Yavatmal district of Maharashtra, for instance, district collectorate records show 2,617 farmer suicides between 2014 and 2021, while police records for the same period put the figure at only 1,207—a discrepancy that always carries the risk of underestimating the true scale of the crisis. Within this, the condition of women farmers remains even more overlooked. When a woman farmer or farm labourer dies by suicide, her death is often recorded under the category of “housewife” because her name does not appear on the land records and she is not formally recognised as a farmer at all; as a result, official data consistently understates the true extent of suicides among women farmers.

The plight of the family left behind after the earning member of a household is lost to suicide is equally telling. Surveys of such families show that a large number are forced to sell their land and livestock to repay debts or meet daily needs. Awareness about compensation, too, remains minimal; many widows do not receive a pension even a year after their husband’s death, and many are denied their rightful share in family land. As a result, women in such families are pushed away from farming and into unorganised work such as wage labour, animal husbandry, or selling milk and fruit — and this chain carries the burden of poverty and insecurity forward into the next generation. Migration is another less-discussed thread of this crisis. Families of farm labourers dependent on seasonal agriculture, particularly in tribal and remote areas, are forced to migrate to cities or other states once the monsoon season ends in search of a livelihood.

Where the option of migration exists, it offers some temporary relief, but where even that is not possible, the economic bind grows only more severe. What is needed today is for policymakers to recognise farm labourers as a distinct group deserving attention in their own right, with equal priority. Concrete steps are needed to expand the reach of schemes like MGNREGA, increase the number of guaranteed workdays, ensure timely payment of wages, and design a separate social security scheme for farm labourers. At the same time, the implementation of minimum support pricesMinimum Support Price (MSP)A form of market intervention by the Government of India to protect agricultural producers against any sharp fall in farm prices, ensuring a minimum profit for farmers. for farmers needs to be made more rigorous, the crop insurance process needs to be simplified and made transparent, and farming practices suited to a changing climate need to be encouraged. Most importantly, both the administration and society must show the sensitivity to see these suicides not merely as statistics, but to understand the shattered worlds of the families behind them. A life extinguished every hour is not merely a statistical entry—behind it lies a family, a village, and a series of dreams left unfulfilled. If this chain is to be broken, policy and compassion must work together; otherwise, next year too, this same figure will stand before us with the same relentlessness.

The Dispute:

Taquidir had provided HR-related consultancy services to a hospitality business and was left chasing unpaid fees. Rather than instructing a conventional solicitor’s firm, she turned to Garfield AI, which she used first to generate pre-action correspondenceFormal Demand LettersOfficial letters sent to an opposing party before legal proceedings are initiated, typically demanding payment or action to resolve a dispute. the formal demand letters that typically precede litigation and subsequently to prepare and issue court proceedings when the debtor failed to pay up. The defendant did not simply contest the claim; it brought a counterclaim of its own—a tactic Taquidir later said felt designed to intimidate her into dropping the case. That counterclaim, too, was resisted through the Garfield AI platform.

As the matter approached trial, Garfield instructed a junior barrister, Dominic Li, to appear for the client. This detail matters, because it draws a firm and probably deliberate line around what the AI platform actually did and did not do.

What the AI Did, and What It Didn’t:

Garfield AI’s own account of the case is candid about the division of labour. The company describes its role as handling “the structured, document-heavy steps” of the small-claims process witness statements, the trial bundleCourt Document CompilationA collection of all documents, evidence, and legal arguments prepared by parties for submission to the court before a trial, used by the judge and advocates., correspondence, and the procedural mechanics of issuing and progressing a claim while leaving oral advocacy entirely to qualified human lawyers.

That distinction was borne out at trial. Legal Cheek’s report on the case is unambiguous that the cross-examination of witnesses, the skeleton argumentSummary of Legal ArgumentsA concise written summary of the main legal points and arguments that a barrister intends to make orally in court, often submitted in advance to the judge., and the “on-your-feet” advocacy in front of the judge were conducted by Li, a barrister from what the outlet describes as a top set with a distinction in the Bachelor of Civil Law. The AI platform did not appear as an advocate before the court at any point. Following the three-hour hearing, which involved multiple witnesses and cross-examination on both sides the court found for Taquidir and dismissed the counterclaim against her.

There is a reasonable case, made pointedly by some commentators on the Legal Cheek report, that the “AI wins court case” framing somewhat overstates the machine’s contribution: a small County Court claim was, in the end, won because a highly credentialled human barrister argued it well. Whether Garfield absorbed the cost of instructing counsel of that calibre for a modest claim, and how that squares with the platform’s ordinary fee structure, is not fully explained in the available reporting. Readers should treat claims about the economics of the model with some caution until Garfield discloses more detail.

The Money:

The commercial contrast is nonetheless striking. Taquidir reportedly paid in the region of £400 in Garfield AI fees to recover the £7,000 she was owed a fraction of what conventional solicitor-led litigation over a comparable sum would typically cost. The losing side, by contrast, had engaged both a solicitor and a barrister. Garfield’s co-founders have framed this asymmetry as the core of their pitch: access to justice for claims too small to interest traditional law firms but too large, and too stressful, for a layperson to pursue alone. Daniel Long, the firm’s co-founder and chief technology officer, has said the platform’s purpose is to give individuals and businesses “the tools to enforce their rights when the traditional route would be too slow, too costly, or too complex,” rather than to displace lawyers outright.

Garfield AI’s Track Record:

Garfield AI received authorisation from the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRASolicitors Regulation AuthorityThe regulatory body for solicitors and law firms in England and Wales, responsible for setting and enforcing professional standards and authorizing legal service providers.) in May of the preceding year a step the SRA’s chief executive, Paul Philip, described at the time as a landmark moment for legal services in England and Wales. Since then, the firm says it has processed more than 600 claims and recovered or resolved roughly £500,000 for users, with individual claim values ranging from about £30 to £10,000. This Wandsworth judgment builds on what the company bills as a string of earlier “firsts,” including being the first AI law firm to issue court proceedings on a client’s behalf and the first to collect on court judgments obtained this way, along with an earlier £7,000 debt recovery for a UK transport consultancy.

The firm’s leadership has also said its model has drawn interest from parts of the judiciary including, per its own press materials, Lord Justice Birss and that it has presented its work to Parliament’s Justice Select Committee. These claims come from Garfield’s own communications and have not been independently verified for this piece; they are reported here as the company’s characterisation of its reception, not as confirmed fact.

Reading the Case Correctly:

It would be a mistake to read this judgment as a court endorsing an “AI lawyer” in the sense of a machine arguing a case. It did not. What the Wandsworth trial actually demonstrates is a hybrid model already familiar to litigators in many jurisdictions, India included: a division between the document-intensive, procedural spadework of civil litigation drafting, bundling, correspondence, evidence organisation and the advocacy that remains, for now, an irreducibly human function requiring judgment, real-time argument, and the ability to respond to a judge’s questions or an opponent’s cross-examination on the spot.

For practitioners in India’s district courts, where the volume of pre-trial drafting plaints, written statements, affidavits, bundles often consumes disproportionate time relative to the substantive legal issues at stake, the Garfield AI case is a useful illustration of where AI assistance is plausibly mature enough to deploy today, and where it is not. It also underscores a point the Supreme Court’s own AI Committee has grappled with in its recent consultations on AI regulation for courts: that the line between permissible AI-assisted drafting and impermissible AI “practice of law” is not always self-evident, and jurisdictions that get ahead of it as the SRA arguably has, through its regulatory approval of Garfield may offer useful templates, and useful cautionary lessons, for regulators elsewhere.

Whether this becomes a template that spreads beyond small-claims debt recovery, or remains a niche solution for a narrow category of low-value, document-heavy disputes, is not yet clear from the available record. What is clear is that the case that made headlines as “AI wins in court” was, at the moment that mattered most when a judge was actually weighing the evidence argued by a human being.

China’s 2021 Civil Code formally unified marriage, family, and inheritance law across the country, but its application to Muslim minorities, particularly Uighurs and Hui communities, has functioned as an instrument of cultural erasure rather than neutral legal reform. Authorities have banned the nikah vow itself from wedding ceremonies in Xinjiang, with officials openly stating that omitting Islamic religious elements from marriage, funeral, and naming ceremonies is treated as a marker of loyalty to the Party-state, while performing them can lead to detention on charges of “religious extremism”.

This is uniformity pursued not to protect individual rights within a marriage but to dissolve religious identity into a secular, Chinese national identity, reinforced by a broader 2026 “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law” that further narrows space for distinct religious and cultural practice. Even where the state permits a legally registered civil marriage, the substance of the couple’s own religious commitment is criminalized, which is why scholars describe China’s approach as coercive assimilation rather than legal reform.

This is the cautionary model: a uniform code that uses “modernization” as a pretext to target the religious content of a minority’s family life, rather than the specific harms individuals within that community may suffer. It is instructive precisely because it shows what a UCC becomes when the state substitutes ideological conformity for genuine, evidence-based protection of individual rights.

Constitutional restraint outperforms coercion, and India’s constitutional framework has deliberately avoided the Chinese path. Article 44Article 44 of the Indian ConstitutionA Directive Principle of State Policy that states, ‘The State shall endeavor to secure for the citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout the territory of India.’ places the UCC in the non-justiciable Directive PrinciplesDirective Principles of State Policy (DPSP)Guidelines or principles enshrined in Part IV of the Indian Constitution, intended to be kept in mind by the state when framing laws and policies, though not directly enforceable by courts., and the Supreme Court, across decades, from the Kesavananda Bharati observations in 1973 through Shah Bano (1985), Sarla Mudgal (1995), and Jose Paulo Coutinho (2019), has repeatedly called a UCC desirable while refusing to compel or impose it unilaterally, recognizing that a one-stroke implementation “may perhaps be counter-productive to the unity and integrity of the nation,” as the Court cautioned in Pannalal Bansilal. This is the opposite of China’s approach: the Indian Court’s institutional instinct has been that reform must be earned through consensus and constitutional scrutiny, not imposed as a marker of political loyalty. In bulldozing their way to force the uniformity India’s legislators are suggesting that it “may perhaps be counter-productive to the unity and integrity of the nation” is not something that is of much concern to them.

Where the Court has intervened in Muslim personal law, it has done so narrowly and on evidentiary grounds, not by decreeing wholesale uniformity. In Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), the five-judge bench struck down instantaneous triple talaq (talaq-e-biddatTalaq-e-Biddat (Instantaneous Triple Talaq)The practice of a Muslim man divorcing his wife by uttering the word ‘talaq’ three times in one sitting, which was declared unconstitutional by the Indian Supreme Court.) by a 3:2 majority, holding it “manifestly arbitrary” and unconstitutional, notably not because the Court decided Muslims must be brought into a uniform code, but because even the All India Muslim Personal Law Board conceded that ShariatShariat (Islamic Law)The moral code and religious law of Islam, derived from the Quran and the Sunnah (teachings and practices of Prophet Muhammad). itself “strongly condemns” the practice. In other words, the Court did not strike down any provision of Islamic Law; it struck down an aberration, a practice that was actually no part of Islam as it actually was.

Justice Nariman’s opinion emphasized that a practice sinful under the very religious text that supposedly sanctions it cannot claim protection as an essential religious practice under Article 25. Parliament then criminalized the practice through the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. Crucially, Shayara Bano’s original 2016 petition challenged three practices together, talaq-e-biddat, polygamy (actually, polygynyPolygynyA form of polygamy in which a man has more than one wife at the same time.), and nikah-halala, but the Court’s bench confined its ruling to the one practice where the internal religious inconsistency was clearest and conceded by the community’s own representative body. Polygyny and nikah-halala were possibly left for more informed consideration at some later instance.

Indian Approach and Nikah Halala

Note what is stated above : triple talaq was declared void not because the Court decided Muslims must be brought into a uniform code, but because even the “AI Muslim PLB” conceded that Shariat itself “strongly condemns” the practice. In other words the Court did not strike down any provision of Islamic Law : it struck down as an aberration a practice that was actually no part of Islam as it actually was.

This is precisely the model that should govern how the state treats nikah halala as practiced today: not a Chinese-style ban on a named “Islamic practice,” but a Shayara Bano-style recognition that the practice, as commonly carried out, has no genuine Quranic sanction and can be addressed through existing law without legislating against Islam itself.

Surah Al-Baqarah 2:230 permits remarriage to a former husband only after a woman has entered a genuine, unplanned subsequent marriage that ends naturally through divorce or death. The version reported across India, a pre-arranged, temporary marriage entered into solely to enable reunion with the first husband, inverts this entirely, and authentic hadith recorded in Sunan Abi Dawud report the Prophet ﷺ cursing both the muhallilMuhallilIn the context of nikah halala, the second husband who marries a divorced woman with the intention of divorcing her so she can remarry her first husband. and the muhallal lahuMuhallal LahuIn the context of nikah halala, the first husband who wishes to remarry his divorced wife after she has married and divorced a second man. for exactly this arrangement. When the Supreme Court agreed in 2018 to examine nikah-halala alongside polygamy (polygyny, actually), Deobandi clerics themselves publicly stated that “nikah halala as is being interpreted by the governments and media is not recognized even in Islam”.

The doctrinally consistent path, following Shayara Bano rather than the Chinese model, is to treat the sham version of halala as a fraud on consent, prosecutable through existing provisions on cheating, criminal conspiracy, and exploitation of a dependent party, maybe even human trafficking laws, rather than through a new statute naming and banning “the Islamic practice of halala.” This achieves the protective goal without either the Chinese error of coercive religious erasure or the drafting error of criminalizing a practice the faith’s own primary sources never sanctioned in that form.

Note that the Supreme Court has long held that persons who are differently placed need not be treated identically, and that Article 14Article 14 of the Indian ConstitutionGuarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws within the territory of India, prohibiting discrimination. permits reasonable classification when the distinction has an intelligible differentiaIntelligible DifferentiaA legal term referring to a clear and rational basis for distinguishing between persons or things for the purpose of classification in law, permissible under Article 14. with a rational nexusRational NexusA legal term requiring that the basis of classification (intelligible differentia) must have a reasonable and logical connection to the object sought to be achieved by the law. to the object sought to be achieved. In Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar and Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, the Court laid down the classic test that equality does not forbid all differentiation, only arbitrary differentiation; later decisions such as State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar and E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu reaffirm that discrimination arises from hostile or irrational treatment, not from constitutionally justified classification. On that footing, a law that treats persons differently because their factual or legal positions are not the same does not offend equality merely because it does not apply one uniform rule to everyone.

The Supreme Court has also repeatedly recognized that reasonable classification is constitutionally permissible when it is grounded in real differences and bears a rational nexus to the law’s object. The differential rules in Islamic shariah relating to inheritance and testimony are not discrimination, but a structured allocation of rights and duties within a distinct jurisprudential scheme. The common assertion that a woman receives only “half” an inheritance is an oversimplification, since in many cases she receives a full defined share while the larger share to a male heir is accompanied by corresponding financial obligations toward dependents and family maintenance. Likewise, the idea that a woman’s testimony is inherently worth half of a man’s is often misunderstood; in the relevant jurisprudential context, testimony is treated as a duty shared so that two women collectively bear one testimonial burden, reducing the risk that a lapse in memory by one witness unfairly invalidates the evidentiary account, rather than casting any inference of falsehood on women as a class.

Speaking out against Islamic practices to cater to constituencies, while disregarding facts, is itself aberrant. It beats reason that there can be an attempt to ensure social peace by such distractions, despite damage to the nation’s secular fabric and despite legislative actions sowing apprehension in the minds of the Muslim community that would invite charges under 153A IPC 1860 or 196 BNS 2023 if the acts involved lay citizenry. or 196 BNS 2023Section 196 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023The corresponding section in India’s new criminal code, replacing IPC 153A, which addresses similar offenses related to promoting enmity between groups. if the acts involved lay citizenry.

When the legislating minds stop seeing Islam and Islamic practices as “the others” or “aliens” or “outsiders” they will start thinking free from prejudices and hostility, and then India shall see legislation conforming strictly to Constitutional norms where none feels discriminated against for his or her religious orientation. Till then, the Muslims wait, and trust that the judiciary will see what the politicians don’t…or maybe actually do but pretend that they don’t.

They trust that the judiciary will see through false equivalences, and will also see corrective action through.

Jai Hind

Every constitutional democracy rests upon an elementary proposition: citizens relinquish the private exercise of force because they trust public institutions to administer justice according to law. The modern State claims a monopoly over legitimate coercion only because constitutional institutions promise an impartial, accessible, and effective system for resolving disputes. Courts therefore perform a function extending well beyond adjudication. They preserve the moral and legal legitimacy upon which democratic governance depends.

The Indian Constitution reflects this understanding through an integrated structure of fundamental rights, separation of powersGovernmental StructureA doctrine dividing the governmental powers into distinct branches (legislative, executive, and judicial) to prevent the concentration of power and provide checks and balances., judicial reviewLegal PrincipleThe power of courts to determine whether a law, action, or decision violates a country’s constitution, and to strike it down if it does., equality before law, and the rule of law. These constitutional commitments require more than formal compliance with legal procedure. They require institutions capable of responding effectively when constitutional values are threatened by communal violence, organized intimidation, or systematic attacks upon judicial independence.

Public confidence in the judiciary is therefore not an incidental virtue but an essential constitutional resource. Unlike the executive, courts possess neither electoral legitimacy nor coercive power. Their authority derives principally from public acceptance that judicial decisions represent the final and impartial application of constitutional principle. Whenever that confidence weakens, constitutional governance itself becomes vulnerable.

Contemporary constitutional debate has increasingly focused upon judicial delay, mounting arrears, and procedural complexity. These concerns are generally discussed as questions of judicial administration. However, there is a broader proposition. Persistent institutional delay, selective constitutional intervention, and the perceived reluctance to exercise available constitutional authority in matters affecting the integrity of the rule of law together produce consequences extending far beyond case management. They reshape public perceptions regarding whether constitutional institutions remain capable of protecting citizens equally and effectively.

Particular attention must therefore be directed toward cases involving communal polarization, inflammatory public discourse, intimidation of judicial officers, and violence directed against vulnerable communities. These situations test not merely the correctness of individual judicial decisions but the institutional capacity of constitutional courts to preserve democratic order under conditions of sustained social conflict.

What can be called the concept of institutional abandonment has arisen, and would best describe circumstances in which constitutional institutions remain formally functional while progressively losing their practical capacity to reassure citizens that justice will be delivered effectively, impartially, and within a meaningful time.

Institutional abandonment differs from constitutional breakdown. It represents a gradual erosion of legitimacy arising from cumulative inaction rather than sudden collapse.

The consequences of such erosion are profound. Citizens deprived of confidence in legal institutions may increasingly regard litigation as symbolic rather than effective. Social groups may seek political influence in place of legal remedies. Victims may perceive constitutional guarantees as aspirational rather than enforceable.

In its most dangerous manifestation, the abandonment of institutional confidence creates conditions in which private retaliation begins to appear more effective than public justice. The constitutional order is endangered not because vigilantismUnlawful ActionThe act of a private citizen or group taking law enforcement into their own hands without legal authority, often in response to perceived failures of the official justice system. becomes legally acceptable, but because legal institutions cease to appear practically reliable, and self-help seems the only available resource.

Therefore the durability of constitutional democracy depends as much upon institutional responsiveness as upon constitutional text. Judicial legitimacy is sustained not only by principled judgments but also by visible institutional willingness to defend the rule of law when it faces its greatest tests. Where constitutional courts consistently demonstrate that law prevails over intimidation, democratic confidence is strengthened. Where institutional silence becomes recurrent in the face of sustained constitutional challenge, that confidence inevitably diminishes.

The measure of constitutional success is not merely the number of judgments delivered. It is whether citizens continue to believe that the Constitution remains the most effective instrument through which justice may be obtained. Constitutional neutrality is not the same as constitutional passivity. Judicial restraint cannot justify institutional silence where the administration of justice itself is threatened. One institution, the Supreme Court Bar Association, is reported to have condemned the threat to the judge who passed the judgement in the lynching case. That is a heartening feature.

The Constitution of India guarantees freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a), recognising that democratic governance depends upon the uninhibited exchange of ideas, criticism of government, and robust public debate. Yet the Constitution has never regarded free expression as an absolute liberty divorced from constitutional responsibility. Article 19(2) expressly authorises reasonable restrictions in the interests of, inter alia, the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, public order, decency, morality, and the prevention of offences. Constitutional freedom therefore exists within a framework designed to preserve both liberty and the equal constitutional status of every citizen.

The constitutional challenge lies in identifying the point at which protected political advocacy ceases to be an exercise of democratic freedom and becomes an instrument for undermining the constitutional order itself. Democracies must tolerate disagreement, criticism, unpopular opinions, and even deeply offensive speech. They cannot, however, remain indifferent where expression is deliberately employed to promote hostility against identifiable communities, encourage discrimination, or create conditions conducive to violence. The distinction is neither ideological nor political; it is constitutional.

The Supreme Court has consistently recognised that free speech occupies a preferred position within the constitutional framework. Equally, it has affirmed that speech intentionally calculated to threaten public order or undermine constitutional values may attract legitimate regulatory intervention. The constitutional inquiry is therefore not whether speech is agreeable or disagreeable, but whether its nature, context, intent, and likely consequences place it beyond the protection ordinarily afforded to democratic discourse.

This distinction assumes particular importance in relation to broadcast media. Unlike private conversation, televised broadcasts and digital media possess extraordinary capacity to shape public perception, construct social narratives, and influence collective behaviour. Their impact is amplified by repetition, visual imagery, emotive presentation, and algorithmic dissemination. Consequently, broadcasters exercise not merely the freedom to communicate but also the constitutional responsibility to avoid becoming vehicles for systematic incitement or organised social hostility.

The constitutional obligation imposed upon the media does not require ideological neutrality. Democratic journalism is necessarily argumentative, investigative, and often sharply critical. It may expose governmental failures, question judicial decisions, challenge prevailing orthodoxies, or advocate unpopular political positions. None of these functions threatens constitutional democracy. Indeed, they strengthen it.

The constitutional difficulty arises where journalism ceases to inform public discourse and instead seeks to construct identifiable communities as permanent objects of suspicion, hostility, or exclusion.

Within this framework, controversy surrounding certain television broadcasts, including programmes aired by Sudarshan News and hosted by Suresh Chavhanke, illustrates broader constitutional questions concerning media responsibility. Public criticism of some broadcasts has centered on allegations that they portrayed members of the Muslim community through recurring narratives of demographic threat, institutional infiltration, or organised conspiracy. The widely publicised “UPSC Jihad” broadcasts became the subject of judicial proceedings after concerns were raised that the programmes attributed disloyalty and subversive intent to Muslim candidates entering the civil services without credible evidentiary foundation.

The constitutional significance of these proceedings lies not in the political identity of the broadcaster but in the legal principles engaged. Judicial scrutiny focused upon whether freedom of expression protects broadcasts that allegedly stigmatise entire communities through unsupported generalisations capable of intensifying communal distrust. The issue therefore transcended editorial preference; it engaged the constitutional relationship between expressive liberty and the State’s obligation to preserve equality, fraternity, and public order.

Equally significant is the distinction between criticism and legal adjudication. Public commentators, legal scholars, civil society organisations, and political actors may characterise particular broadcasts as inflammatory, communal, or ethically irresponsible. Constitutional adjudication, however, requires courts to apply objective legal standards rather than rhetorical labels. The legitimacy of judicial intervention depends upon demonstrable legal reasoning, careful examination of context, and adherence to constitutional principles rather than ideological agreement or disagreement with the content of expression.

This distinction protects both free speech and constitutional governance. It ensures that courts neither become censors of unpopular opinion nor passive observers where constitutional rights of vulnerable communities are endangered.

The constitutional role of the judiciary, therefore, is not to supervise political discourse but to preserve the legal conditions within which democratic discourse remains possible.

The tension between expressive liberty and constitutional equality ultimately reflects a deeper constitutional commitment. The Constitution does not merely protect the liberty of speakers; it also protects the equal dignity and citizenship of those who are spoken about. Speech that systematically dehumanises, demonises, or excludes identifiable communities raises constitutional concerns because it undermines the fraternity envisioned by the Preamble and the equal protection guaranteed by Articles 14, 15, and 21. Constitutional democracy cannot flourish where entire communities are repeatedly represented as enemies within the nation itself.

The problem extends beyond individual broadcasts. Repeated dissemination of narratives portraying minorities as existential threats gradually alters the constitutional environment in which institutions operate. Public officials may experience increased pressure, investigative agencies may become susceptible to majoritarian expectations, witnesses may fear participation in judicial proceedings, and trial judges deciding communally sensitive cases may confront organised campaigns of intimidation. Hate speech thus produces consequences extending far beyond immediate audience reaction; it can progressively weaken the institutional conditions necessary for impartial administration of justice.

Accordingly, the constitutional response to inflammatory broadcast speech should not be understood as a conflict between censorship and liberty. Rather, it represents an effort to reconcile two constitutional imperatives of equal importance: the preservation of democratic freedom of expression and the protection of the constitutional order from systematic campaigns that erode equality, fraternity, and the rule of law. A constitutional democracy capable of protecting only one of these values ultimately secures neither.

It is within this broader constitutional setting that the question of judicial responsibility assumes decisive importance. Where communal polarisation intensifies through organised public discourse, constitutional courts are required not merely to decide isolated disputes but to preserve the integrity of the constitutional framework itself. Whether they consistently discharge that responsibility forms the central inquiry of the succeeding chapters.

The Constitutional Duty : Defend Rule of Law

The legitimacy of constitutional adjudication depends upon considerably more than the correctness of judicial outcomes. Courts derive authority from the public perception that constitutional rights will be protected impartially, fearlessly, and within a timeframe that preserves their practical value. Justice delivered after constitutional injury has become irreversible may satisfy procedural requirements while failing constitutional expectations.

Delay, inconsistency, and institutional silence are therefore not merely administrative deficiencies; they may become constitutional defects when they undermine the effective enjoyment of fundamental rights.

A condition in which constitutional institutions remain formally functional yet progressively fail to perform the protective role assigned to them by the Constitution, institutional abandonment, does not imply institutional collapse, bad faith, or deliberate dereliction. Rather, it denotes a cumulative erosion of constitutional confidence produced by persistent inaction, selective intervention, or the inability to respond effectively when the rule of law itself is subjected to sustained pressure.

Unlike executive authorities, constitutional courts possess neither financial resources nor coercive machinery. Their authority is institutional rather than physical. It depends upon the confidence of litigants, subordinate courts, public authorities, and society at large that judicial determinations will be respected because they represent the authoritative application of constitutional principle. Every failure to protect that institutional confidence therefore diminishes not merely the reputation of individual courts but the constitutional architecture itself.

This distinction becomes particularly significant where trial judges adjudicate cases involving communal violence, organised criminality, political influence, or majoritarian mobilisation. Such judges occupy the constitutional front line. Their courts constitute the first forum where constitutional guarantees are translated into enforceable legal rights. If trial judges cannot discharge their functions free from intimidation, organised pressure, or fear of personal consequences, constitutional rights become contingent upon social power rather than legal principle.

Judicial independence is frequently discussed as though it concerns only the constitutional courts. Such an understanding is incomplete. The independence guaranteed by the Constitution extends to every judicial officer entrusted with deciding disputes according to law. The credibility of the Supreme Court and the High Courts ultimately depends upon the confidence with which subordinate judges can decide cases involving influential individuals, politically sensitive controversies, or communal violence without apprehension that institutional protection will be unavailable when most required.

This constitutional responsibility extends beyond adjudication of appeals. Constitutional courts possess extensive supervisory powers designed not merely to correct legal error but to preserve the institutional integrity of the administration of justice. Those powers include constitutional jurisdiction, supervisory jurisdiction, contempt jurisdictionJudicial PowerThe power of a court to punish individuals for acts that obstruct or interfere with the administration of justice, or show disrespect for the court’s authority., and administrative authority over the subordinate judiciary. Their cumulative purpose is to ensure that courts remain institutions governed exclusively by law rather than by intimidation or external influence.

Accordingly, threats directed against judicial officers cannot be understood as ordinary criminal conduct affecting isolated individuals. They constitute direct assaults upon the constitutional system itself.

Every attempt to intimidate a judge seeks simultaneously to influence future adjudication, discourage judicial independence, undermine public confidence, and communicate that organised pressure may achieve what legal argument cannot. The constitutional injury therefore extends far beyond the personal security of the individual judicial officer.

When constitutional courts respond promptly and unequivocally to such threats, they reaffirm the supremacy of law over intimidation. Conversely, prolonged institutional silence or delayed intervention risks conveying an unintended but dangerous impression that attacks upon judicial independence do not demand immediate constitutional concern. Even where such an impression is inaccurate, its constitutional consequences may nevertheless be profound because institutional legitimacy depends as much upon public perception as upon institutional intention.

This phenomenon illustrates the distinction between procedural functionality and constitutional effectiveness. Courts may continue disposing of thousands of cases annually while simultaneously losing public confidence in their willingness to intervene decisively when constitutional fundamentals are challenged. Quantitative performance therefore cannot substitute for qualitative constitutional leadership.

The problem becomes particularly acute in matters involving communal violence and hate-driven offences. Such litigation rarely concerns individual criminal liability alone. These proceedings test the capacity of constitutional institutions to reassure vulnerable communities that legal rights will prevail over collective intimidation. Delays, inconsistent responses, or visible reluctance to confront organised pressure may inadvertently strengthen the perception that constitutional protection varies according to the political or social context of particular cases.

The consequences extend beyond immediate litigants. Witnesses may become reluctant to testify. Investigating agencies may fear public backlash. Prosecutors may proceed cautiously where constitutional firmness is required. Most significantly, subordinate judges may perceive that institutional support cannot be assumed if their judicial duties provoke organised hostility. These secondary effects gradually erode the practical administration of justice despite the continued formal operation of legal institutions.

Institutional abandonment therefore differs fundamentally from ordinary judicial backlog. Case accumulation reflects limitations of infrastructure, judicial vacancies, procedural complexity, and increasing litigation. Institutional abandonment, by contrast, concerns the constitutional allocation of institutional attention. It arises where matters directly affecting the integrity of constitutional governance—including attacks upon judicial independence, systematic communal intimidation, or persistent assaults upon the rule of law—fail to receive the urgency their constitutional significance demands.

This distinction is particularly important because constitutional courts necessarily possess limited institutional capacity. No judiciary can intervene immediately in every controversy. Constitutional criticism should therefore focus not upon the impossibility of universal intervention but upon identifiable patterns of institutional prioritisation. Where constitutional urgency appears inconsistent across categories of cases, legitimate questions arise regarding the principles governing institutional attention. Such questions should be examined objectively, recognising both the complexity of judicial administration and the constitutional expectation that the most fundamental threats to the rule of law receive timely and effective institutional response.

The constitutional cost of institutional abandonment is cumulative rather than immediate. Public confidence rarely disappears because of a single controversial judgment or isolated delay. It erodes gradually as citizens observe recurring disparities between constitutional promise and institutional experience. Rights remain formally guaranteed, yet increasingly uncertain in practical enforcement. Judicial independence remains constitutionally proclaimed, yet appears vulnerable to organised pressure. Equality before law continues to exist doctrinally, while confidence in its uniform application progressively weakens.

The ultimate danger is not criticism of the judiciary. Constitutional courts have always been, and must remain, subject to principled public scrutiny. The greater danger lies in the gradual normalisation of institutional scepticism. Once citizens begin to regard constitutional litigation as incapable of providing meaningful protection in the most consequential cases, the judiciary risks losing not merely public approval but constitutional authority itself.

The preservation of judicial legitimacy therefore requires more than doctrinal excellence. It demands visible institutional willingness to defend the rule of law precisely when doing so is difficult. Constitutional democracy measures its courts not by their performance during periods of institutional comfort but by their fidelity to constitutional principle during moments of constitutional stress. It is in such moments that the distinction between judicial restraint and institutional abandonment becomes most consequential.

The next inquiry naturally follows: if institutional abandonment weakens confidence in lawful justice, what replaces it? The answer is neither constitutional nor democratic. It is the gradual emergence of private justice, retaliatory violence, and vigilantism as perceived alternatives to institutions that no longer appear capable of vindicating the rule of law.

Duty to Protect Judges and Advocates in Vitiated Atmospheres

Judicial independence is commonly discussed in relation to constitutional courts. Public discourse frequently concentrates upon the appointment, tenure, and institutional autonomy of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, treating the subordinate judiciary principally as an administrative extension of the higher judicial system. Such an understanding is constitutionally incomplete. The administration of justice begins not in constitutional courts but in trial courts, where evidence is recorded, witnesses are examined, facts are determined, and constitutional rights first assume practical meaning. The constitutional promise of equal justice therefore depends fundamentally upon the independence, security, and institutional confidence of trial judges.

The Constitution of India does not regard judicial independence as a privilege conferred upon judges. It is a structural guarantee afforded to citizens. An independent judiciary exists not to protect judicial office but to ensure that every litigant receives adjudication free from political influence, communal pressure, economic coercion, or public intimidation. Judicial independence is therefore an indispensable component of the rule of law, inseparable from Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and reinforced by the constitutional separation of powers.

International legal standards reinforce this constitutional understanding. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary recognise that judges must be able to discharge their functions without improper influence, inducement, pressure, threats, or interference, whether direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. These principles impose corresponding obligations upon States to secure conditions in which judicial officers may decide cases solely according to law.

Similarly, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct identify independence as the indispensable precondition for every other judicial virtue. Impartiality, integrity, equality, competence, diligence, and accountability cannot exist where judges must constantly evaluate the personal consequences of legally correct decisions. The ethical obligations imposed upon judges therefore presume reciprocal institutional obligations owed by constitutional authorities.

These international principles are not foreign additions to Indian constitutional law. They reflect values already embedded within the constitutional structure and repeatedly acknowledged by Indian courts. The Supreme Court has consistently recognised judicial independence as forming part of the Constitution’s basic structure. Yet the practical implications of that doctrine extend beyond institutional autonomy in matters of judicial appointments. They require effective institutional protection whenever judicial officers become targets of intimidation arising directly from the faithful discharge of judicial duties.

The distinction between appellate independence and trial independence deserves particular attention. Constitutional controversies ultimately reach the Supreme Court only after years of litigation. Trial judges, by contrast, confront immediate pressures. They preside over communal violence prosecutions, organised crime trials, political corruption cases, terrorism prosecutions, offences involving influential economic interests, and disputes capable of generating intense public mobilisation. Their constitutional vulnerability is therefore immediate rather than theoretical.

Whenever organised groups seek to intimidate judges through demonstrations, threats, vilification campaigns, social media harassment, or indirect pressure upon their families, the objective extends far beyond influencing a single proceeding. Such conduct attempts to communicate that adverse judicial decisions will attract personal consequences extending beyond the courtroom. The resulting constitutional injury affects not merely the individual judge but every future litigant whose case depends upon fearless adjudication.

Institutional responses to such intimidation therefore possess constitutional significance independent of the underlying litigation. Prompt intervention reassures the judiciary that constitutional institutions will defend judicial independence whenever necessary. Equally important, it communicates to society that disagreement with judicial decisions must remain confined to lawful legal processes rather than coercive public pressure.

The opposite response carries substantial constitutional risk. Where intimidation appears to attract inadequate institutional attention, trial judges may reasonably perceive that institutional support cannot be assumed in matters generating organised hostility. Such perceptions need not influence actual judicial reasoning to produce constitutional harm. Judicial independence depends as much upon institutional confidence as upon individual courage. A constitutional system should never require personal heroism as a substitute for institutional protection.

Comparative constitutional practice illustrates this principle with considerable clarity. Democracies committed to the rule of law recognise that attacks upon judges threaten the administration of justice itself rather than merely individual office holders. Protective mechanisms therefore extend beyond ordinary criminal investigation to include institutional statements, enhanced security, disciplinary consequences for interference with judicial proceedings, and where appropriate, the exercise of contempt jurisdiction to preserve public confidence in judicial authority.

The Indian constitutional framework already contains substantial legal mechanisms capable of achieving these objectives. Constitutional courts possess supervisory jurisdiction over the subordinate judiciary, extensive contempt powers, and broad authority to protect the administration of justice.

The issue is therefore less one of constitutional capacity than of constitutional deployment. Existing powers are fully capable of responding to organised attempts at judicial intimidation where circumstances justify intervention.

This observation should not be misunderstood as suggesting that every criticism of a judicial decision requires constitutional sanction. Open criticism of judgments constitutes an essential feature of democratic accountability. Lawyers, academics, journalists, litigants, and citizens remain free to question legal reasoning, expose judicial error, advocate appellate review, and debate constitutional doctrine. The constitutional boundary is crossed only when criticism becomes intimidation, when disagreement becomes coercion, or when lawful dissent transforms into attempts to influence adjudication through fear rather than argument.

That distinction preserves both judicial independence and democratic freedom. Judges must remain accountable to law rather than immune from criticism. Equally, criticism must remain directed toward legal reasoning rather than personal intimidation. Constitutional democracy requires both propositions simultaneously.

The protection of judges assumes particular importance in cases involving communal violence and hate-driven offences. Such proceedings frequently generate intense public emotion, organised political mobilisation, and competing narratives extending well beyond the legal issues before the court. Trial judges deciding these matters perform a constitutional function essential to democratic stability. Their judgments affirm that criminal liability depends upon evidence and law rather than communal identity or political influence. Failure to protect judges discharging this responsibility risks communicating that constitutional adjudication itself is negotiable.

The constitutional consequences extend beyond individual prosecutions. Witnesses observing institutional reluctance to protect judges may hesitate to testify. Prosecutors may become increasingly cautious. Investigating agencies may fear that successful prosecutions will generate institutional controversy rather than institutional support. Gradually, the practical administration of justice becomes distorted despite the continued formal existence of constitutional guarantees.

Ultimately, judicial independence should not be measured by the absence of executive interference alone. It should also be measured by the confidence with which every judicial officer can discharge constitutional responsibilities without apprehension that fidelity to law will invite abandonment by the institutions entrusted with preserving judicial authority. Constitutional democracy demands nothing less.

If the State claims the exclusive authority to administer justice through independent courts, it necessarily assumes the reciprocal constitutional obligation to ensure that those courts, and particularly those judges who stand at the front line of constitutional adjudication, are never left to confront organised intimidation alone. Judicial independence is not fully secured when judges are free to decide cases. It is secured only when they know that the Constitution will stand behind them after they have done so.

Bachmeier Paradigm : Vigilantism

Every constitutional democracy is founded upon a fundamental renunciation. Individuals surrender the private right to exact retribution because the State assumes exclusive responsibility for the administration of justice. Criminal law is therefore not merely an instrument of punishment; it is the constitutional mechanism through which society replaces vengeance with adjudication, passion with evidence, and retaliation with due process. The legitimacy of this arrangement depends upon a reciprocal constitutional obligation: the State must provide justice that is impartial, accessible, and sufficiently timely to retain public confidence.

Vigilantism represents the breakdown of this constitutional compact. It emerges whenever individuals conclude that lawful institutions are either unwilling or incapable of providing meaningful justice. The vigilant does not merely violate criminal law; the vigilant implicitly rejects the institutional legitimacy of the State itself. For that reason, acts of private retaliation should be understood not only as criminal offences but also as constitutional indicators revealing diminished confidence in public institutions.

The widely discussed case of Marianne Bachmeier illustrates this phenomenon with unusual clarity. In 1981, during the criminal trial of the man accused of abducting and murdering her young daughter, Bachmeier entered the courtroom and shot the accused dead : an unmistakable criminal act, but one that raises a question. Can violence acquire moral legitimacy?

The incident became a symbol of the emotional distance that may develop between legal procedure and a victim’s expectation of justice. Constitutional legitimacy depends not only upon institutional performance but also upon the public belief that lawful institutions remain capable of delivering justice worthy of public confidence.

The Bachmeier incident demonstrates the point at which private grief, frustration, and public perception converge to produce conduct fundamentally inconsistent with the rule of law. The lesson is not that vigilantism becomes understandable in legal terms. Rather, it is that constitutional institutions should regard such events as warnings requiring careful institutional reflection.

Modern constitutional democracies encounter this phenomenon in diverse forms. Victims occasionally seek retaliation outside the legal process. Communities sometimes endorse extrajudicial punishment where criminal investigations are perceived as ineffective. Public celebrations of “instant justice” following police encounters periodically reflect similar institutional anxieties. Although these phenomena differ significantly in legal character, they share a common constitutional characteristic: each reflects diminished confidence that ordinary legal processes deliver effective and timely justice.

The constitutional danger extends beyond isolated incidents. Once citizens begin evaluating lawful adjudication against extrajudicial alternatives, the normative authority of the legal system begins to erode. Criminal courts no longer represent the exclusive forum for justice but merely one option among competing mechanisms of social response. Such a transformation fundamentally contradicts constitutional democracy, whose legitimacy depends upon universal acceptance that disputes and crimes will be resolved through law rather than private power.

Judicial delay occupies a central position within this constitutional analysis. Delay should not be understood merely as administrative inconvenience. Rights postponed beyond meaningful effectiveness frequently cease to operate as practical guarantees. Criminal trials extending over many years, repeated adjournments, prolonged uncertainty for victims and accused persons alike, and inconsistent enforcement of judicial directions collectively weaken public confidence in institutional effectiveness. Justice delayed affects not only individual litigants but also the constitutional credibility of the legal system itself.

Yet, Constitutional institutions operate under substantial constraints, including increasing litigation, limited judicial resources, procedural safeguards, and the complexity of modern adjudication. Nevertheless, constitutional analysis requires recognition that persistent delay carries systemic consequences extending beyond administrative efficiency.

Particular concern arises where communal violence, hate-driven offences, or politically sensitive prosecutions remain unresolved for prolonged periods. Such cases frequently possess symbolic significance extending far beyond individual criminal liability. They communicate whether constitutional guarantees operate equally irrespective of communal identity, political influence, or public pressure. Delayed resolution in such matters may unintentionally reinforce perceptions that constitutional protections are uncertain precisely where they are most urgently required.

Where citizens repeatedly observe institutional delay, inconsistent urgency, inadequate protection for judicial officers, or perceived reluctance to address organised intimidation, confidence in constitutional institutions will progressively diminish. The resulting constitutional injury can be measured in the falling public expectations of effectiveness of lawful justice.

Due process remains indispensable because justice obtained through arbitrary violence destroys the legal order even where it punishes genuine wrongdoing. At the same time, procedural safeguards lose practical legitimacy if institutions become incapable of delivering timely and effective adjudication.

The rule of law survives only while citizens continue believing that constitutional institutions provide a more legitimate, more reliable, and ultimately more just alternative than private retaliation. Every successful prosecution conducted fairly, every fearless judicial decision, every witness protected from intimidation, and every timely appellate intervention reinforces that constitutional belief.

Bachmeier demonstrates that private violence often emerges not from rejection of justice but from rejection of institutional confidence. Constitutional courts must preserve the public conviction that lawful institutions remain capable of delivering justice sufficiently effective such that private retaliation never appears to constitute a plausible alternative.

When citizens abandon the courtroom for retaliation, the fracture has already occurred. The violence is merely its visible consequence. The real failure is erosion of confidence that courtrooms are capable of delivering justice.

Constitutional democracy is endangered when increasing numbers of citizens come to believe that vigilantism is more certain, more effective, or more meaningful than the justice promised by the Constitution.

Organised intimidation directed against judges, prosecutors, witnesses, or investigating agencies inevitably communicates a broader social message. Other communities, victims of communal violence, vulnerable minorities, and even individuals unconnected with the original litigation may begin to question whether constitutional institutions will protect them with equal determination when confronted by organised hostility. Constitutional confidence is cumulative, as is doubt.

If repeated threats to judicial officers, or sustained attempts to influence the administration of justice through fear and public pressure, are not met with prompt and unequivocal institutional responses, the resulting perception of abandonment may gradually spread beyond the affected case. What started with claims of ignoring an adverse court verdict in Babri is raising its head every now and then. What is not nipped in the bud grows in strength. Citizens increasingly conclude that the practical availability of justice depends less upon constitutional guarantees than upon social influence, political strength, or numerical dominance. Such a perception strikes at the heart of the rule of law.

Some individuals or groups may come to regard lawful adjudication as ineffective and begin to perceive private retaliation, collective self-protection, or other forms of extra-legal self-help as the only remaining means of securing justice. Such conclusions reflect a loss of faith in democratic institutions themselves. The constitutional objective, therefore, is not merely to punish vigilantism after it occurs. It is to preserve public confidence so completely that vigilantism never acquires even the appearance of being a conceivable alternative.

Constitutional courts bear an institutional obligation to preserve public confidence that the Constitution remains capable of protecting every individual equally, fearlessly, and effectively. That obligation is discharged through visible institutional conduct demonstrating that constitutional guarantees are practically enforceable and are in fact enforced.

The Constitution does not merely promise the existence of courts; it promises the existence of courts capable of securing justice. Articles 14, 21, 32, 136, 141, 142, 226 and 227 collectively establish an institutional architecture designed to ensure that constitutional rights are not merely declared but effectively protected. The legitimacy of that architecture depends upon public confidence that constitutional remedies remain meaningful when fundamental rights face their greatest tests.

The need for reassurance becomes most acute during periods of social conflict. Episodes involving communal violence, organised hate campaigns, attacks upon judges, intimidation of witnesses, threats against prosecutors, or coordinated efforts to undermine judicial authority generate consequences extending beyond the immediate litigation. They create uncertainty regarding whether constitutional institutions retain both the capacity and the willingness to enforce the rule of law without regard to political influence or majoritarian pressure. It is precisely in these circumstances that constitutional courts perform their most important democratic function.

Constitutional courts have to respond effectively where the integrity of the administration of justice itself is endangered. The obligation arises not from political controversy but from institutional necessity.

Organised intimidation directed against judges, systematic interference with criminal trials, persistent attempts to influence judicial outcomes through fear, or sustained campaigns seeking to delegitimise lawful adjudication threaten not individual proceedings but the conditions necessary for impartial justice.

Judicial responses in one case influence public expectations in many others. Citizens rarely evaluate courts solely through personal litigation. Rather, confidence develops through observation of how institutions respond to cases carrying wider constitutional significance. Every prompt defence of judicial independence reassures countless citizens who may never themselves enter a courtroom. Equally, every visible institutional hesitation may generate apprehension among communities that constitutional protection will diminish precisely when they become politically unpopular or socially vulnerable.

A decisive judicial response to organised intimidation reassures every subordinate judge, every witness contemplating testimony, every investigating officer conducting an impartial investigation, every prosecutor discharging constitutional duties, and every citizen who depends upon the courts for protection against unlawful power. Conversely, institutional silence may unintentionally communicate that constitutional guarantees become uncertain whenever legal adjudication collides with organised pressure.

The robe worn on the Bench carries this responsibility.

Jai Hind

There is a fault line running through the constitutional topography of India’s tribal heartland, one that rarely surfaces in policy documents but quietly shapes the lives of millions. It is the fault line between two radically different legal grammars.

Tribal rights, as embedded in the Fifth Schedule and the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (“PESA”), speak the language of spatial protection: land, territory, community, and cultural continuity. Labour laws, by contrast, speak the language of functional protection: wages, hours, contracts, and individual entitlements within market transactions. When these two grammars are forced to operate in the same geography—the mineral-rich, displacement-scarred tribal belts of Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh, and Andhra Pradesh—they do not simply co-exist. They collide.

The paradox is almost grotesque in its irony: Schedule V areas sit atop nearly 70% of India’s Coal Reserves, vast deposits of iron ore, bauxite, and manganese. They are the geological engine of India’s industrial economy. Yet the indigenous Adivasi population of these regions is, in overwhelming numbers, reduced to informal daily-wage labour, seasonal migrants, contract workers, and quarry hands on their own ancestral lands. The constitutional shields exist; they are just pointed in the wrong direction.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARADOX

A. Paragraph 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule: A Dormant Sword

The Governor of a Schedule V state holds extraordinary constitutional power under Paragraph 5(1): the authority to direct that any central or state law shall not apply to a Scheduled Area, or shall apply only with such modification as the Governor specifies. In theory, this is a sweeping instrument for tribal-sensitive governance.

In practice, it has been deployed almost exclusively to address land alienation and moneylending, the two most visible, ‘photogenic’ symptoms of tribal dispossession. The labour market, where the actual dispossession now happens, has been almost entirely ignored.

When the central government enacted four consolidated labour codes between 2019 and 2020, not a single Governor’s notification undertook a serious tribal impact assessment or sought to modify their application to Schedule V areas. The Industrial Relations Code, the Code on Wages, 2019, and The Code on Social Security, 2020, were all applied to tribal territories as if Jharkhand’s informal mining workforce operated under identical conditions to a formal factory in Pune. This is not an oversight; it is a structural choice, and its costs are borne entirely by tribal workers.

B. Article 23 and the Grammar of Neo-Bondage

Article 23 of the Indian Constitution prohibits “traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour”. Courts have interpreted “force,” but not broadly enough. The displacement-to-dispossession pipeline that characterizes tribal industrial zones produces what can only be called economic neo-bondage: self-sufficient farming communities are uprooted by mining projects, rendered landless, and then re-absorbed as informal contract labour by the very corporations that displaced them. The tribesperson who was a subsistence farmer with land rights became a wage labourer with no legal status, no collective bargaining power, and a debt-driven compulsion to accept whatever terms were offered. The chains are invisible, but the bondage is real.

Article 23’s prohibition was designed precisely for this, coerced labour arising not from physical constraint but from the elimination of all viable alternatives. The displacement-driven informal labour trap is, in its essence, a constitutional violation hiding in plain sight.

III. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL ARCHIETECTURE: Landmark Judgments

A. Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) : Trusteeship Cannot Be Partial

The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s Samatha’s judgment is rightly celebrated for striking down private mining leases in tribal areas and articulating the state’s role as a trustee for tribal welfare. But the jurisprudential implications extend further than land leases, and this extension has been entirely ignored.

If the state is a trustee for tribal communities, that trusteeship cannot be surgically limited to the moment of land transfer. It must follow the tribal person into the labour market. A state that refuses to grant mining lease on tribal land but then permits the mining corporation to hire displaced tribals as unregistered contract workers, without enforcing minium wages, without providing safety inspections, without ensuring social security, is betraying the trustee relationship at every subsequent step. Samatha created the doctrine; its architects simply failed to follow it downstream

B. Orissa Mining Corporation v. MoEF (2013): The Niyamgiri Paradox

In the Niyamgiri judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court recognized that the Gram Sabha of the Dongria Kondh held ultimate sovereignty—more powerful than a multi-billion-dollar mining corporation, more powerful than the state government—over whether Vedanta’s bauxite project could proceed. of the Dongria Kondh held ultimate sovereignty, more powerful than a multi-billion-dollar mining corporation, more powerful than the state government, over whether Vedanta’s bauxite project could proceed. The community said no, and the project died.

This is, by any measure, a remarkable constitutional moment. Yet it illuminates a profound contradiction: the Gram Sabha can veto the project entirely, but once any project is approved, the same Gram Sabha has zero recognized authority over the labour conditions of the workers it generates. A village council that can kill a ₹50,000 crore investment cannot compel a subcontractor to pay minimum wages. This is not law being applied consistently; it is power being rationed selectively, and tribal communities consistently receive the ceremonial version.

C. People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) v. Union of India (1982): The Subsidy Hidden in Enforcement Failure

Justice Bhagwati’s foundational ruling in PUDR established that economic compulsion, the absence of any real alternative, is sufficient to constitute “force” under Article 23. The judgment held that construction workers receiving below-minimum wages were victims of forced labour within the constitutional meaning.

Apply this logic to remote mining belts today. Minimum wage enforcement in geographically isolated tribal regions is, by documented evidence, almost absent. Inspectors rarely visit; when they do, contractors have advance notice. The practical effect is that the State systematically subsidizes corporate labour costs through enforcement non-feasance. It is constitutional forced labour, not by explicit coercion, but by the deliberate abdication of the protective duty the State assumed when it enacted minimum wage legislation in the first place.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL FRICTION: PESA v. The Bureaucratic Inspectorate

The structural mismatch between tribal governance and formal labour administration is perhaps most visible at the institutional level. The consequences of this friction are an administrative vacuum. Labour Inspectors under the new labour codes are urban-trained, Hindi or English-medium bureaucrats assigned to territories where the relevant language may be Gondi, Mundari, or Kui. They operate out of district headquarters, often hundreds of kilometres from the worksites they nominally supervise. Contractors in remote mining clusters operate for years without a single compliance visit. The formal labour inspectorate is not merely understaffed; it is structurally alien to the terrain it is supposed to govern.

V. The Case for Institutional Convergence

The answer is not merely more inspectors; it is different inspectors, or more precisely, the democratization of the inspection function itself.

India’s constitutional architecture already contains the answer. The Gram Sabha, when genuinely empowered under PESA, is the only institution with local legitimacy, linguistic fluency, and lived knowledge to meaningfully oversee labour relations in tribal areas. What is needed is a formal bridge between PESA’s governance framework and the labour codes’ substantive protections.

Concretely, this means:

1. Labour Contract registration at the Gram Sabha level: No contractor should be permitted to engage tribal workers without prior registration with the relevant Gram Sabha, creating a traceable record.
2. Seasonal migration tracking: Gram Sabhas should be designated as the formal departure and registration point for seasonal migrant workers from their jurisdiction, feeding into the e-Shram database..
3. Primary conciliation authority: Gram Sabhas should be empowered to resolve wage disputes up to a defined threshold, reducing dependence on district-level machinery that tribals cannot practically access.

The gap between India’s constitutional intent and ground-level reality in Schedule V areas is not a gap in law; it is a gap in institutional imagination. The constitution gives tribal communities the shields. The task now is to ensure those shields face the right direction: not just against the developer at the gate, but against the wage thief already inside.

Presided over by Justice Praveen Kumar Giri, the ruling in Umme Farva v. State of U.P. and Another laid down stringent, sweeping directives to check the abuse of police machinery and protect the fundamental liberties of citizens. The court made it clear that when individuals use the police as a tool for personal vendetta, they and the complicit officers who facilitate them must face strict legal consequences.

The Roots of the Dispute

The case before the High Court originated from a bitter domestic conflict. The informant, Dr. Mahmood Alam Khan, was working as a Research Professor at Hanyang University in Seoul, South Korea, in 2020. He alleged that his wife, Umme Farva, was living in a live-in relationship with another man in Korea. Following his complaints to the Korean authorities, the couple divorced according to Sharia law.

However, the dispute escalated when Dr. Khan returned to India and filed a guardianship case in Aligarh. In September 2023, he filed a First Information Report (FIR) at Police Station Kwarsi in Aligarh against his former wife, claiming she and her partner were defaming him and his daughter on Facebook using abusive language, and had threatened to eliminate him if he returned to India. The police registered the FIR under Sections 504 and 507 of the Indian Penal Code (IPCIndian Penal CodeThe main criminal code of India, defining various offenses and their punishments.), which deal with intentional insult and criminal intimidation by anonymous communication.

The applicant, Umme Farva, countered that she was being subjected to malicious harassment. Her counsel argued that she had been ousted from her matrimonial home and subjected to cruelty, and that the husband was filing a barrage of false complaints out of pure malice.

The local police investigation eventually vindicated her position. Finding no evidence to substantiate the husband’s dramatic claims, the Investigating Officer submitted a final closure report in June 2024, effectively seeking to drop the case.

The Magistrate’s Error and Procedural Short-Circuits

What should have been the end of an unfounded prosecution instead exposed a deeper flaw in the lower judiciary’s handling of criminal procedure. Following the police’s final report, the husband filed a protest petitionProtest PetitionA petition filed by an informant or complainant challenging a police closure report, requesting the court to take cognizance of the case.. In October 2024, the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJMChief Judicial MagistrateA judicial officer who presides over the court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate, having significant powers in criminal cases.) of Aligarh accepted the husband’s protest, rejected the police closure report, and took cognizance of the matter. The CJM decided to proceed with the case as a “State case” (a police-led prosecution) under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPCCode of Criminal ProcedureThe primary legislation governing the procedure for administration of criminal law in India.) and issued summons to the wife.

This is where the High Court stepped in, identifying multiple profound legal errors in the Magistrate’s order.

First, Sections 504 and 507 of the IPC are legally classified as non-cognizable and bailable offences, carrying a maximum punishment of two years. This makes them “summons cases,” not “warrant cases”. Under the law, a police officer cannot automatically register an FIR or initiate an investigation for non-cognizable offenses without an explicit order from a competent Magistrate. Instead, the police should have registered a Non-Cognizable Report (NCR) under Section 155 of the CrPC.

By registering an FIR directly, the Kwarsi Police Station House Officer (SHO) bypassed the statutory checks and balances, misusing the process of law right from the inception of the case. Justice Giri observed that this was not a mere technical oversight but a direct violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law.

Accountability for False Informants

The truly revolutionary aspect of the Allahabad High Court’s judgment lies in how it addresses the aftermath of a false case. The court observed that when an investigation reveals that an FIR or NCR was built entirely on fabrications, the police cannot simply file a closure report and walk away.

Under Sections 177 and 182 of the IPC (now corresponding to Sections 212 and 217 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, or BNSBharatiya Nyaya SanhitaA new substantive criminal law in India, replacing the Indian Penal Code (IPC), defining offenses and punishments.), furnishing false information to a public servant with the intent to cause harm to another person is a distinct criminal offense. The High Court ruled that investigating officers are under a statutory obligation to proactively file a formal, written complaint against malicious informants and false witnesses.

To streamline this process, the judgment includes full, ready-to-use structural formats in both Hindi and English for police officers to submit these complaints. If the police fail to file these complaints alongside their closure reports, the court warned that the officers themselves could be prosecuted under Section 199(b) of the BNS for knowingly disobeying legal directions to the prejudice of a citizen.

Furthermore, the High Court directed that if a Magistrate rejects an informant’s protest petition and accepts the police’s final closure report, the court must immediately proceed with the complaint against the informant for misleading the state and weaponizing the law.

The New Procedural Shield under the BNSS:

The judgment also provides critical clarity on how the transition from the old CrPC to the new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which took effect on July 1, 2024, impacts ongoing cases. Even though the alleged offenses in this case occurred before July 2024, the High Court reaffirmed that procedural laws that benefit an accused person must be applied dynamically.

Under the first proviso of Section 223 of the BNSS, a Magistrate is required to provide an opportunity of hearing to the proposed accused before taking cognizance or issuing a summoning order. In the case of Umme Farva, the Aligarh CJM had issued a summoning order in October 2024 without granting her any such hearing. The High Court soundly rejected this approach, highlighting that ignoring this mandatory pre-cognizance hearing violates the refined statutory protections enacted by the legislature.

The High Court ultimately quashed the CJM’s arbitrary summoning order, remanded the matter back to the local court, and ordered a fresh evaluation that strictly complies with the law and respects the rights of the accused.

Directives Issued by the High Court:

1. Mandatory False-Information Complaints: Police must file written complaints under Section 212/217 BNS against informants if an FIR/NCR is found to be false.
2. Judicial Check on Overreach: Magistrates cannot accept a closure report without checking if it is accompanied by a complaint against the informant.
3. Strict Compliance with BNSS: Accused individuals must be granted a hearing before a court takes cognizance on a protest petition on or after July 1, 2024
4. Officer Accountability: Police or prosecuting authorities who fail to execute these duties will face disciplinary actions and potential contempt of court.

The Allahabad High Court’s ruling sends an unequivocal message across Uttar Pradesh: the state’s law enforcement machinery cannot be hired out as a private tool for harassment. By demanding accountability from both dishonest litigants and negligent police officers, the court has reinforced the constitutional sanctity of Article 21. For public-interest advocacy, this judgment serves as an essential precedent to curb the systemic rot of malicious prosecutions that clog Indian courts and destroy innocent lives.

The Fallacy of the “Theological Shield”

The core of the judiciary’s reasoning most recently articulated in cases involving the denial of SC status to converts, rests on the assumption that caste is an intrinsic feature of Hinduism, and therefore, conversion to a “caste-less” religion (like Christianity or Islam) inherently dissolves the social disability. This logic, however, suffers from a disconnect with the lived reality of Dalit converts.

Sociological studies and the persistent demand for the inclusion of “Dalit Christians” and “Dalit Muslims” demonstrate that the stigma of untouchability and the socio-economic barriers attached to one’s ancestral caste do not disappear upon baptism or conversion to Islam.

The judiciary, by relying on doctrinal tenets (such as quoting biblical verses or equating conversion to a “metamorphosis“), has substituted social reality with formal theological interpretations. In Soosai v. Union of India (1985), the Court itself acknowledged the need for socio-economic data to resolve the question of disability after conversion, a mandate that has been conspicuously absent in recent sweeping denials of such rights.

Existing judgements require reconsideration via understanding the fallacy of “Eclipse” vs. Extinguishment. The judiciary has often rejected the argument that caste remains in a state of “eclipse” upon conversion and can be resumed upon reconversion. This view fails to recognize that a community’s social identity is determined by historical, exclusionary practices rather than mere religious observance, and that this identity remains tied to the individual regardless of their current faith.

While the Constitution allows for the protection of historically oppressed groups, the current interpretation penalizes the exercise of Article 25Freedom of ReligionA fundamental right in the Indian Constitution guaranteeing all persons the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, and health. (the right to profess, practice, and propagate religion). By creating a “religious test” for constitutional benefits, the state indirectly coerces individuals to remain within the Hindu fold to retain their socio-economic entitlements: a clear breach of the secular promise of the Constitution.

The pendency of the K.G. Balakrishnan CommissionInquiry into Dalit Converts’ StatusA commission constituted by the Indian government in 2022, headed by former Chief Justice of India K.G. Balakrishnan, to examine the issue of granting Scheduled Caste status to Dalits who have converted to Christianity or Islam., tasked with examining the feasibility of extending SC status to Dalit converts, suggests that the issue is far from settled. For the judiciary to issue definitive, restrictive rulings while such institutional inquiries are ongoing is to ignore the complex, ground-level data that defines caste-based discrimination in India.

Jurisprudential reform is needed if the purpose of reservation is to “undo the asymmetry” of caste, and the ground for reservation must be the disability itself, not the religious label.

As long as the caste network continues to determine access to employment, social dignity, and protection from violence, the state must delink the eligibility for affirmative action from the profession of a particular faith.

The judiciary must transition from a “religious identity” model of reservation to a “social reality” model.

Acknowledging that one can be both a practitioner of a different faith and a survivor of caste-based exclusion is not a “fraud on the Constitution“; it is a recognition of the incomplete nature of India’s social justice project. The blanket application of a rigid, archaic mechanism that protects the state from the burden of inclusion at the cost of the constitutional rights of the most vulnerable offends the guarantees of Article 25.

The recent 2026 Supreme Court ruling which maintains that individuals who convert to religions other than Hinduism, Sikhism, or Buddhism are ineligible for Scheduled Caste status and the associated reservation benefits is not a progressive ruling.

Jai Hind

Reading some writings on her before I went to meet her recently, I found that she has often been presented as an instinctively violent personality. However, my impression of her in the course of our long conversation was that of a highly dignified, polite and gentle woman who may quickly get angry when confronted with acts of injustice but who at heart is basically concerned with creating a world without such injustices. The most important learning of her life is not the endlessly told stories of how she taught a big lesson or two to those trying to trouble innocent women or indulging in various corrupt activities, but instead it is how a big movement could start with a simple village woman based on her sincerity and courage.

While the courage of Sampat in taking up cases of violence against women initially attracted several women as well as others, she also showed wisdom in consolidating these gains by forming savings groups of women. These grew in strength and soon there were about three hundred women as firm supporters. It was at this stage that they contributed small savings to purchase a pink saree for each one of them, giving them a pink identity which eventually brought them the name of the gulabi (pink) gang, a name which somehow stuck.

The gulabi gangGulabi GangA women’s vigilante group and social movement in India, founded by Sampat Pal Devi, known for its members wearing pink sarees and fighting against injustice, particularly violence against women and corruption. ‘Gulabi’ means pink in Hindi. was soon not only tackling cases relating to violence against women, in addition, it was also playing a big role in fighting corruption in the public distribution systemPublic Distribution System (PDS)An Indian government-sponsored system that distributes subsidized food and non-food items to India’s poor. It is often a target for corruption. and in checking development work irregularities. This social movement also raised a strong voice against the increasing consumption of alcohol and smokeless tobacco/gutkha, also fighting for the removal of some liquor vends. Sampat told me that she could persuade many men to give up alcohol.

Some aspects of this journey appear to have greatly attracted women as the number of her supporters grew by leaps and bounds, despite several obstacles being placed in her path from time to time. Some accounts mention well over 200,000 members in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, but there is a support base in some other states as well. Several of these women have established a reputation for significant work in their own right, gaining a good reputation in their own districts or work areas. Sampat Pal particularly mentioned the names of Pushpa Singh from Rae Bareilly, Uma Verma from Chhindwara and Farida Begum from Mahoba.

After a journey of about two decades Sampat Pal is also thinking of starting some service-based activities, although her main identity remains that of a fighter for justice and for just causes.

While most of the time she has been fighting for justice for women victims, she has not hesitated to come to the help of those men who have been wrongly accused or implicated by women in some cases. It is her sense of fairness and justice that is the deciding factor. Recently, in her home district Banda, when one of the most sincere and courageous activists Raja Bhaiya was implicated in some cases and accusations, she was in the forefront of many distinguished persons as well as common villagers who came forward to support Raja Bhaiya in difficult times. Pointing to the wife of Raja Bhaiya (a very soft-hearted village woman) and their three daughters, she asked loudly, with a flash of her famous anger showing at last—should we not be concerned about these women, who as family members of a badly victimized person, a sincere and good person, have suffered a lot? Later she was present at a public meeting which unanimously passed a resolution for ending the victimization of Raja Bhaiya as well as women and Dalit colleagues who have worked with him.

It is interesting and useful to note that while Sampat Pal may have lacked higher education at a formal level, her learning in the course of struggles as well as her strong sense of fairness and justice have led her to selecting issues and cases for support or resistance in a very thoughtful manner. This has played an important role in the fast, largely spontaneous spread of this social movement without the availability of either any organized or institutional funding or any formal support structure.

Lakshmi Kushwaha lives in Bahera village of Niwari district in Madhya Pradesh. She comes from a 10-member joint family. Until some time back, she used to go to a hand-pump located at a distance of about 1 km from her home six times a day for meeting the water needs of the family. Her sister-in-law also helped in a similar way. In one round Lakshmi used to fetch about 35 liters of water. She used to carry a pitcher on her head and a can in one hand.

Despite her willingness to work so hard for fetching water, during the summer and other times of water scarcity there was no certainty that she would immediately get water at the hand-pump. She often had to wait her turn for a long time. To avoid long delays sometimes she got up at 3 am at night to leave to fetch water.

For Lakshmi the most frustrating experience was to keep thinking about arranging water even when she was away from home for some time. Sometimes as soon as she returned home, regardless of how tired she felt, her first task was to leave to fetch water.

The difficulties experienced by Sudha Ahirwar, who lives in Churara village of the same district, were no less. She comes from a smaller 4-member family and there was no sister-in-law to share the burden. She went 7 times a day to fetch water from a hand-pump located at a distance of about 1 km. She also carried a pitcher and a can.

However in her case there was also an additional complication. The nearest hand-pump was located across the railway track. So if a train came, she was held up for a long time, waiting for it to depart.

This also meant that she had to take extra care for safety. So while covering the short stretch of the railway track, she could not go with both the pitcher and the can. The most difficult part of water fetching is to place the pitcher properly and balance it on the head cover. However in her case she had to take down the pitcher as she approached the railway track, and carry it in her hands to place it on the other side of the track, then similarly carry the can and finally balance the pitcher again on her head before starting the second stretch of her journey.

In addition Sudha had to cope with long delays while waiting for her turn at the tap. Sometimes her pitcher and can were placed so far behind in the line that she found it time saving to come home after placing the utensils in the line, then cook a vegetable before returning to fill in the pitcher and the can. To avoid such delays she too sometimes went around 3 am to fetch water.

Sudha realized soon after her marriage that fetching water every day was to now become her most regular task. However she had no experience of this from pre-marriage days. As a result in the initial days her water-filled pitcher fell down several times from her head and was smashed to pieces. This sometimes led to anger in the family as she was found to be lacking in an essential skill.

Keeping in view their highly tiring, time-consuming, and occasionally frustrating experiences with fetching water, one can imagine how relieved these women, and so many others like them in their villages, felt when tap water started coming to their village recently under the Jal Jeevan Mission. As Lakshmi said, the village in which we were married suddenly started appearing more beautiful and attractive.

To their credit both Lakshmi and Sudha are utilizing the extra time now available to them for not only their personal tasks but also for social responsibilities relating to helping their communities. They are both Jal SahelisWater Friends/VolunteersWomen volunteers, often from local communities, who are trained and empowered to promote water conservation, manage water resources, and ensure water adequacy in their villages. (women volunteers who together take forward initiatives of water conservation and adequacy). This initiative of Parmarth social organizationParmarth Samaj Seva SansthanAn Indian non-governmental organization (NGO) actively involved in rural development, particularly focusing on water conservation, sanitation, and women’s empowerment in regions like Bundelkhand. has attracted widespread attention in recent years. Now Jal Sahelis like Sudha and Lakshmi are also able to get more time for such community work as they are free from the responsibilities of fetching water. Hence their contribution for community work is also increasing. In fact Sudha recently joined a march from BundelkhandGeographical Region in IndiaA historical region in central India, divided between the states of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, known for its challenging terrain and frequent water scarcity issues. to Delhi for spreading the message of protecting Yamuna river.

Thus while tap water has certainly brought big relief to many women like Sudha and Lakshmi, our story will not be complete without recounting the situation one or two generations earlier. In another village of this region I spoke to an approximately 75-year-old woman about her experiences of about 40 years back. She said that she lived in a 35-member joint family and many women shared the responsibility for fetching water from a well. She had to walk for about 300 meters for this. She said she routinely could take four utensils in one trip, balancing two pitchers on her head, and two utensils in her hands. However it was interesting that she did not speak of this experience as a burden, just as easily accepted, routine work. Did she ever break pitchers? Well, she tried to remember, once a naughty family member said something terribly funny as she was passing by and as she burst into laughter, one pitcher fell down.

So probably the difference then was that the well was well-filled, not requiring any wait or tension of not getting water. Additionally, many women members in the big family shared the burden, while some water needs, like for bathing, were met away from home at a tank or well.

So while we cannot say that fetching water was a big burden throughout history, what we can say is that due to various changing circumstances, it has indeed become a significant burden in recent times. Therefore, it is truly positive that women are now feeling relieved of this major burden in villages where tap water is reaching all or most homes.

The Ruling

On June 30, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States delivered its final and most consequential opinion of the 2025–26 term, affirming a New Hampshire federal district court’s injunction against Executive Order 14160, President Donald Trump’s attempt to redefine who qualifies as a citizen at birth. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for a six-justice majority that included Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson, held that children born in the United States to parents who are unlawfully or only temporarily present in the country are nonetheless “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment14th AmendmentA post-Civil War amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1868, that granted citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the U.S., including former slaves, and guaranteed equal protection of the laws.‘s Citizenship ClauseCitizenship ClauseThe first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”, and are therefore citizens from the moment of birth .

The Citizenship Clause, ratified in 1868, provides that all persons “born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” are citizens of the United States and of the state in which they reside. Roberts framed the outcome as a matter of historical continuity rather than innovation, tracing the constitutional guarantee back through English common law, the demands of the American colonists for the “rights of Englishmen,” and the abolitionist movement’s understanding of birthright citizenship as a natural entitlement rather than a conditional grant. The Court’s opinion frames citizenship itself as something close to a foundational civic promise, one the majority says the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers extended to every person born on American soil and that the Court was simply honoring rather than expanding.

From Executive Order to Class Action

Trump signed Executive Order 14160 on January 20, 2025, his first full day back in office, directing federal agencies to stop recognizing as citizens any child born in the U.S. to parents who were either undocumented or present on temporary visas. The order was blocked almost immediately by multiple district courts, which found it plainly incompatible.

The administration’s opening legal maneuver was procedural rather than substantive: it asked the Supreme Court to curb the practice of nationwide injunctionsNationwide InjunctionsCourt orders that block a government policy or action not just for the parties involved in a specific lawsuit, but across the entire country., arguing that individual district judges should not be able to block a federal policy for the entire country. In Trump v. CASA (June 2025), the Court agreed by a 6-3 vote, ruling that federal district courts generally cannot issue universal injunctions but it left the underlying constitutional question about birthright citizenship untouched. The same day, the ACLU responded by filing a new class-action suit, Barbara v. Trump, in the District of New Hampshire, seeking class-wide relief for every child who would lose citizenship under the order. The representative plaintiff, identified only by her first name for safety reasons, is a Honduran national. District Judge Joseph Laplante granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the executive order likely contradicted both the constitutional text and unbroken precedent. The Trump administration appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which heard oral argument on April 1, 2026, with the President himself in attendance reportedly the first sitting president to attend Supreme Court arguments in person.

Wong Kim Ark and the “domicile” Argument

The central legal battle revolved around the 1898 precedent United States v. Wong Kim ArkUnited States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898)A landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that affirmed the principle of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment for nearly all individuals born in the United States., in which the Court held that a man born in San Francisco to Chinese parents ineligible for naturalization was nonetheless a citizen by birth. The government did not ask the Court to overrule Wong Kim Ark outright; instead, the Solicitor General argued that the case’s repeated references to the petitioner’s parents being “domiciled” in the United States meant that lawful domicile not mere physical presence was the true constitutional threshold for birthright citizenship. Under that theory, undocumented immigrants and temporary visa holders, lacking lawful domicile, could be excluded .

The majority rejected this reading. Roberts’s opinion concluded that domicile featured in Wong Kim Ark only as an uncontested background fact of that case, not as a legal precondition, and that no evidence from the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification debates supports treating domicile as a gatekeeping requirement for birthright citizenship. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, in a concurrence partly joined by Justice Sotomayor, wrote separately to push back on Justice Thomas’s characterization of the Citizenship Clause as a narrow, race-specific remedy intended only for freed slaves, arguing that this reading sits uneasily with the broader emancipatory purpose of Reconstruction-era constitutional change.

The Dissents

Three of the Court’s conservative justices dissented, though not as a unified bloc. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, authored a lengthy dissent reportedly running over ninety pages arguing that the Citizenship Clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteed citizenship only to persons both born and domiciled in the United States, and that the majority’s account of history is inaccurate. Thomas suggested the Fourteenth Amendment has been “repurposed for political projects” its Reconstruction-era authors never intended, drawing a sharp rebuke from Jackson’s concurrence.

Justice Samuel Alito, dissenting separately, called the ruling “one of the most important decisions in the history of the Court” while simultaneously insisting it was wrongly decided, warning that it extends citizenship even to children of so-called “birth tourists.” Justice Gorsuch, despite joining Thomas’s opinion in part, filed his own brief dissent raising a pointed internal objection to the domicile theory: if undocumented parents who have built permanent lives in the U.S. are not “domiciled” there, he asked, where exactly are they domiciled given that the law has long presumed every person is domiciled somewhere?

Justice Brett Kavanaugh took a different path altogether, concurring in the judgment but dissenting in part. He agreed the executive order was unlawful, but grounded his reasoning in federal statute the Immigration and Nationality Act rather than the Constitution itself, suggesting that Congress, not the President, would have the authority to narrow birthright citizenship through legislation if it chose to.

What Happens Now

The practical effect of the ruling is that the pre-2025 legal status quo remains intact: a U.S. birth certificate continues to establish citizenship regardless of parental immigration status, and federal agencies cannot impose the additional eligibility screening the executive order contemplated. The Migration Policy Institute had estimated that roughly 255,000 children born annually to non-citizen parents stood to lose automatic citizenship status had the order taken effect, with some potentially left stateless .

President Trump, reacting on Truth Social, called the outcome bad for the country but signaled he would now pursue the same goal through Congress rather than executive action—an avenue Justices Kavanaugh and Alito both suggested, in their separate opinions, remains constitutionally open. Any such legislation would itself likely face immediate constitutional challenge, given the majority’s unambiguous holding that the Fourteenth Amendment itself not merely statute guarantees birthright citizenship to children born on U.S. soil regardless of their parents’ status.

Relief for Indians

For India-linked families in the United States including the large population of H-1B visa holdersH-1B Visa HoldersIndividuals holding a non-immigrant visa that allows U.S. employers to temporarily employ foreign workers in specialty occupations., international students, and undocumented Indian nationals this ruling forecloses, at least for now, any executive attempt to condition a U.S.-born child’s citizenship on parental immigration status. It also underscores a broader point of comparative interest: unlike India’s citizenship law, which since 1987 has progressively moved away from pure jus soliJus Soli (Right of Soil)A principle of nationality law by which citizenship is determined by the place of birth, i.e., the “right of soil.” toward conditions tied to parental citizenship and, in some cases, registration under the Citizenship (Amendment) Act framework, the U.S. Fourteenth Amendment as reaffirmed here continues to anchor citizenship in birth on the territory itself, with only narrow historical exceptions such as children of accredited foreign diplomats.

Historically, Antitrust lawCompetition RegulationLaws designed to promote competition in markets by prohibiting monopolies, cartels, and other anti-competitive practices. viewed monopsony as a geographic fluke. Under Joan Robinson’s classical model, the ultimate monopsonist was defined by isolation. Think of an old-school “company town” where a single coal mine was the only game in town for miles. Back then, workers were stuck because of physical distance, meaning antitrust regulators rarely stepped in unless there was an outright, blatant cartel.

Academics who study competition have reacted rather conservatively: the existing approach, which is based on consumer welfare analysis, considers the labor market consequences of such conduct as externalities. This article challenges that orthodoxy across three contemporary vectors: (i) the emergence of “shadow monopsony” in proprietary virtual workspaces; (ii) the unintended monopsonistic consequences of sustainability-linked hiring consortia; and (iii) the revenue-sharing practices of creator platforms that function, in economic substance, as wage-fixing. Uniting all three is a methodological argument: the measure of monopsony harm must expand beyond wage depression to encompass the suppression of worker innovation, which this article terms the polycentric harm thesisExpanded Monopsony HarmThe article’s proposed framework arguing that monopsony harm extends beyond wage depression to encompass the suppression of worker innovation..

II. SHADOW MONOPSONY IN VIRTUAL LABOUR MARKETS

A. The Architecture of Lock-in

With companies moving towards using digital twin technology and VR environments, the enclosure of labour is happening within the closed ecosystem. The role of the platform owner becomes unique in such an environment because it acts as the landlord, toolchain provider, and the only consumer of digital labour that takes place in that environment. The result is a form of monopsony that does not require geographic dominance; it is constituted by technical architecture.

Interoperability bans are the key instrument. When a platform prohibits the transfer of worker-generated assets, trained models, or reputational history across competing platforms, it destroys the worker’s accumulated human capital outside the platform’s walls. This mirrors the economic logic of company scrip—currency valid only within a single commercial system.

This lock-in isn’t just a technical glitch; it is legally enforced through what can be called an “IP enclosure matrix.” Platforms use the fine print in End-User License Agreements (“EULAsEnd-User License AgreementsLegal contracts between a software developer or publisher and the user of the software, outlining the terms of use.”) and Terms of Service (“ToSTerms of ServiceThe legal agreements between a service provider and a person who wants to use that service, setting out the rules and guidelines.”) alongside aggressive interpretations of intellectual property law to build high walls around their ecosystem. By claiming sweeping copyright over platform-specific assets and classifying system workflows as trade secrets, platforms legally block workers from migrating their own digital tools or outputs elsewhere. The economic reality of this setup is brutal: when a platform claims ownership over a worker’s behavioural data, trained sub-models, or custom virtual tools, it essentially expropriates their dynamic human capital. The worker is forced to leave their accumulated skills and digital identity behind, transferring all the long-term value they accrued to the platform.

B. Avatar and Skill Portability as a Competitive Remedy

Behavioural economics supplies a conceptual bridge here. Workers subject to high switching costs exhibit Status quo biasPreference for Current StateA cognitive bias where people prefer things to stay the same, avoiding change even when an alternative might be objectively better. even when objective conditions would favour exit. The cognitive and economic friction of platform transition produces inertia that suppresses wage negotiation. This is not a voluntary preference; it is a market distortion created by platform design.

Accordingly, competition law should consider mandating “Avatar and Skill Portability,” the technical and legal right of a worker to migrate their verified credential history, algorithmic reputation scores, and digital outputs to competing platforms. The analogy to number portability from telephony is useful: regulatory authorities realised that customer lock-in via non-portable telephone numbers represented a structural impediment; portability was prescribed as a solution to promote competition.

III. THE GREEN MONOPSONY: ESG CONSORTIA AND WAGE SUPPRESSION

A. The Buyer Club Problem

The proliferation of ESG frameworksSustainability CriteriaEnvironmental, Social, and Governance criteria used to evaluate a company’s sustainability and ethical impact, often guiding investment decisions. has coincided with another phenomenon: the creation of sustainable labour standards, which link employment with certified credentials. If several major employers in an industry all require the same certification, they become a buyer club—effectively a coordinated monopsony that operates below the radar of standard antitrust scrutiny for no-poaching and wage-fixing agreements.

This is a matter of structure, not malice. The monopsony effect emerges organically from the convergence of eligibility criteria. Yet the economic consequence is identical to an express price-fixing agreement among buyers: the pool of eligible workers is artificially constricted, their bargaining power is reduced, and wages are suppressed relative to the competitive equilibrium.

This creates a serious legal vulnerability because these ESG consortia effectively operate as information-sharing hubs that facilitate legal cartelization. When top-tier companies get together to create a standardized certified credential, they inadvertently create a completely homogenized buyer profile. Instead of competing for talent, they end up looking for the same rigid compliance boxes.

This sets a massive tension within a modern antitrust framework. Regulators, like those looking at a European Union’s Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions or US antitrust safety zones, are often quick to greenlight corporate cooperation if it is for a “sustainable public good.” But there is a blind spot here. While courts and antitrust agencies happily overlook standard-setting on the output side to help the environment, they completely ignore the devastating, downstream monopsonistic effects on the input, the labour side. By focusing entirely on the green goals, competition policy blindly tolerates an environment where workers lose their bargaining chips, effectively letting corporate buyers fix the rules of the labour market under the banner of sustainability.

B. Sustainability Standards as Barriers to Entry

From the supply side, the harm is distributionally regressive. Credentialing programs entail costs, such as course fees, exam fees, and registration fees, which form a significant burden for poorer employees and employees in developing nations with minimal certification facilities. Ethical sourcing operates as an “exclusionary device,” whereby certification benefits employees from wealthier nations who have received credentials, while poorer individuals’ earning opportunities are constrained. Competition policy has been insufficiently attentive to this dynamic because ESG cooperation is frequently exempted from antitrust scrutiny under sustainability defenses. This article argues that such exemptions should be conditioned on a demonstrable absence of monopsonistic wage effects.

IV. MONOPSONY IN THE CREATOR ECONOMY: THE SSNDR TEST

A. Platforms as Wage-Setters

The creator economy presents competition law with a category problem. Platforms such as YouTube, TikTok, and Twitch have labelled their revenue-sharing model as business dealings with independent contractors. However, there is a monopsonistic element involved, where the platform dictates the price of creative labour without any form of bargaining, and switching to another platform would be prohibitively expensive due to algorithmic capital.

B. Operationalising the SSNDR

The SSNIP testMarket Definition ToolThe ‘Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price’ test, a standard tool in antitrust analysis used to define relevant markets. is the standard instrument for defining relevant markets on the output side. Applied to the labour side of platform markets, it yields a novel analytical tool: the Small but Significant and Non-transitory Decrease in Revenue Share (“SSNDR”) test.

The SSNDR asks whether a hypothetical platform that reduced revenue-share percentages by a small but significant amount, say, five percentage points, would lose a sufficient volume of creators to make the reduction unprofitable. If the answer is no, the platform possesses monopsony power. Preliminary evidence suggests that multi-platform migration involves revenue losses of 40–70% in the transition period, reflecting the non-portability of algorithmic recommendation weight.

To see how this works in practice, imagine a regulatory Body like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Competition Commission of India, Government of India (CCI) bringing enforcement action against the dominant streaming platform. Under the SSNDR framework, the regulator wouldn’t look at routine consumer prices; instead, they would mathematically isolate the “Revenue Share” metric, the percentage of Ad or subscription revenue actually distributed to creators after the platform takes its cut. The regulator would then model the “Cross-elasticity of supplySupply ResponsivenessA measure of how responsive the quantity supplied of one good is to a change in the price of another good.” among these creators to see how sensitive they are to a pay cut.

V. THE POLYCENTRIC HARM THESIS AND PREDATORY WAGE-SETTING

A. Innovation Suppression as a Primary Harm

Competition analysis of labour monopsony has been predominantly wage-centric. This article proposes an expanded, polycentric framework that treats innovation suppression as an independent and potentially primary harm. Where market power concentrates the appropriation of value with the buyer, the marginal return to worker innovation approaches zero. The static wage-suppression harm is thereby compounded by a dynamic innovation loss that extends into the broader productivity trajectory of the economy.

B. The AI Replacement Threat as Predatory Wage-Setting

Firms with monopsony power can exploit information asymmetries about the timeline and scope of automation to engage in predatory wage-setting: reducing wages today because the worker’s outside options are contracting as AI substitution approaches. This is similar to predatory pricing in output markets, in which a dominant company engages in below-cost pricing to drive competitors out of business. Competition agencies need to come up with procedures to investigate this practice by recognizing any AI threats to replace human workers as an abuse of dominance.

Traditional antitrust scholars will inevitably push back here, arguing that replacing human workers with AI is just a standard capital substitution, a textbook example of economic efficiency rather than antitrust violation. But this argument misses the entire point. The legal violation isn’t the actual technological switch; it is how dominant firms use massive information asymmetry as a psychological cudgel.

VI. CONCLUSION

The algorithmic auction is not a metaphor; it is the operational reality of labour markets in which AI coordinates wage-setting, virtual architecture creates inescapable lock-in, and platform design substitutes for cartel agreements. Antitrust law requires doctrinal reconstruction on three fronts: the recognition of interoperability mandates; the integration of buyer-side market power analysis into ESG frameworks; and the adoption of the SSNDR test. The algorithmic auction is ongoing. Doctrinal reform cannot wait for the gavel to fall.

Under this Schedule, a member can be disqualified either for voluntarily resigning from the party or for violating the whipParty DirectiveAn order issued by a political party to its members in a legislature, requiring them to vote in a particular way on a specific issue or bill. during voting in the House. A constitutional amendmentFormal Change to ConstitutionA formal alteration or addition to the Constitution of India, requiring a special majority vote in Parliament. in 2003 made this law stricter still. The earlier “split” provision, under which one-third of a party’s members could break away without facing punishment, was abolished, leaving only the merger exception intact. Under this provision, if two-thirds of a party’s MLAs or MPs agree to merge with another party, no disqualification proceedings apply to them. Today, splits engineered quite deliberately are being dressed up as mergers, so that the group concerned can slip through the law’s net. The very veracity of such claims has repeatedly come under question, since the Supreme Court has, in an earlier ruling, made clear that a genuine merger must involve not just the legislative group but the parent party itself.

Because the many constitutional questions tied to this issue have remained pending in courts for years on end, Speakers and Chairpersons are readily accepting inflated claims of this sort, and this tendency is only deepening with time. The episode in the Shiv Sena followed close on the heels of a rebellion within the Trinamool Congress. Claiming the backing of twenty out of the Trinamool’s twenty-eight MPs, a group led by four-time MP Kakoli Ghosh Dastidar aligned itself with the BJP-led NDA and has now merged with another party. In April, members of the Aam Aadmi Party in the Rajya SabhaCouncil of StatesThe upper house of India’s bicameral Parliament, representing the states and union territories, with members indirectly elected. crossed over to the BJP, as a result of which the party’s strength in the Rajya Sabha fell from ten to three. Now three Rajya Sabha members of the Trinamool Sukhendu Sekhar Ray, Sushmita Dev, and Prakash Chik Baraik have also resigned.

In truth, the Tenth Schedule survives today merely on paper, since the Supreme Court has kept deferring crucial rulings year after year. The cumulative effect of this series of defections has been a swelling of the ruling NDA’s numbers in both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, and this is not a matter confined to technicalities alone it raises several serious questions. At present, the ruling alliance does not command the two-thirds majority in Parliament needed to pass a constitutional amendment. This high threshold was set precisely so that any major change would require broad political consensus. Circumventing that requirement through such manoeuvres whatever attractive name one gives them amounts to nothing less than an insult to the very spirit of representative democracy.

Defection is hardly a new phenomenon. The country has a long tradition of “Aaya Ram, Gaya RamPolitical Defection PhraseA Hindi phrase used in Indian politics to describe the frequent floor-crossing and party switching by elected representatives, often for personal gain rather than ideological reasons.” politics. This story began roughly six decades ago and has still not ended. Neither then nor now has there been any principle or ideology behind such moves the real motive has always been greed for power and money. The framers of the Constitution could scarcely have imagined that political leaders would go to such lengths, yet today this is visible in plain sight. Neither the group that switches sides nor those who engineer the switch feel any shame about it.

Over the past decade, Indian politics has taken on a distinctly different character one in which principles and values are set aside in favour of seizing power by whatever means available. The Bharatiya Janata Party had once given the call for a Congress-free India. Once it gained power, efforts to realise that vision began in earnest, and met with considerable success. This success bred confidence, and under that confidence, the line between right and wrong grew increasingly blurred. Morality has never had much place in politics, but in this new phase, almost everything began to seem justifiable. One outcome of this has been the rise of “washing machine” politics a leader facing allegations or even convicted of a crime emerges “clean” the moment he joins the “right” party. The attitude of “whoever is with us is in the right” has paved the way for achieving objectives by any means necessary. Acquiring power and holding on to it have become virtually the sole purpose. This is a dangerous trajectory, and the heaviest cost of it falls on democratic values and ideals.

This political chapter being written today cannot be described merely as an attempt to capture or retain power what is actually at stake is our entire democratic system. The journey that began with the slogan of a “Congress-mukt Bharat” now appears to be moving toward an an opposition-free India The dismantling currently underway of small and regional parties is itself a warning sign. As the English phrase goes, this is “loud and clear” unmistakably visible. To ignore it would be to shirk one’s responsibility toward democracy itself.

For democracy to succeed, the existence of a capable opposition is indispensable. A strong opposition is every bit as necessary as a strong government. When the voice from the opposition benches weakens, the ruling side gains a free hand to act as it pleases this could well be termed an “elected autocracy.” Averting this danger requires alert voters who understand the importance of a capable opposition and who keep a close watch on every such manoeuvre.

Given the present plight of small parties and the ongoing efforts to render them inconsequential, the times ahead look set to grow even harder for democracy. Recent developments only confirm that anti-democratic forces are becoming increasingly active. Not long ago, we witnessed Aam Aadmi Party MPs from Punjab gravitating toward the BJP. After that, following its electoral defeat in Bengal, many Trinamool MLAs and MPs were seen taking a different path. The latest example is the further fracturing of Uddhav Thackeray’s already-divided party. Going by the present situation, there are also signs that Sharad Pawar’s Nationalist Congress Party could meet a similar fate. A minister in Uttar Pradesh has even hinted at having an eye on Akhilesh Yadav’s Samajwadi Party. In Bihar, Nitish Kumar’s Janata Dal United has already seen its strength diminished, and Lalu Prasad Yadav’s party too remains under a hanging sword.

Taken together, all these events point to one single thing a deliberate, organised effort to hollow out the opposition benches. When the opposition weakens, the very mechanism meant to act as a check fails, and it is out of that vacuum that authoritarian tendencies draw their strength.

Having a strong government at the Centre is, in itself, no bad thing, nor is there anything wrong with strong governments in the states. But this strength must not come at the cost of constitutional values. It is precisely the responsibility of a strong government to remain vigilant, of its own accord, about preserving democratic traditions.

After independence, when the Congress government first came to power, the opposition benches in Parliament were nearly empty. Of 489 seats, Congress had won 364. Among the remaining 125 seats, the largest number belonged to the Communist Party of India a mere sixteen seats. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh had won only three seats. At such a time, the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, told his own party’s MPs that since the opposition was so weak, it fell upon them to keep watch over the government’s functioning in effect, to play the role of the opposition themselves. This statement reveals not only Nehru’s commitment to democratic values but also how deeply he understood that democracy is meaningless without a capable opposition.

Today, however, the picture has reversed entirely. The ruling group is seeking, by whatever means, to weaken its rivals. Operations carried out under names like “Operation Lotus” or “Operation Tiger” are themselves proof of this. If democracy is to keep breathing, such manoeuvres must be resolutely defeated.

The remedy for this lies in sharpening the anti-defection law further. First and foremost, there should be a provision requiring that a member who leaves a party must also relinquish their seat in the House. For an elected representative to switch sides in this manner is nothing less than a betrayal of the trust voters placed in them. Basic morality dictates that anyone wishing to change parties should first vacate their seat and seek a fresh mandate from the electorate. Why this provision was left out when the original law was framed remains a puzzle. This gap must now be filled. But the question remains who will bring about this change? For those who have the power to do so are themselves the biggest beneficiaries of this very game. Even so, a solution must be found, because what is at stake is nothing less than the survival of our democracy itself.

By prior planning, they met at a common spot and then walked rapidly together to the Pahuj river. Here they dug up soil and filled this in sacks. Then they carried these sacks and deposited these in a place where these would help to create a temporary bund which in turn would help the village to obtain more water during the dry season. This technique called bori bandhaan, was a traditional method they were familiar with. being a traditional method they were familiar with this. They wanted to use this to conserve water but as several villagers ridiculed the idea of a few women accomplishing such a big task, instead of facing discouraging words, they had decided to start the work quietly.

Their first problem came when they ran out of their own stock of sacks which they had kept at the riverside. However, a voluntary organization, Parmarth, well known to them, was happy to quietly provide whatever additional sacks they needed. Hence, their work continued for five days, contributing nearly three hours of voluntary work every day. Despite feeling tired and weak, they were determined to take it further. During these five days they could fill, carry and place about 650 sacks.

While working, the women said encouraging words to each other but at the same time, inwardly, they were worried as the task appeared to be a very big one. Somehow, they suppressed such worries as they needed to keep their spirits high to keep working.

On the fourth day, a local news channel heard about this and reported that these women were working in such hot weather to help their village, and that the administration should contribute to these efforts. This prompted some helpful officials to take up the remaining work and on the sixth day, government-supported work started here on a larger scale.

When the women voluntary workers heard about this they were very happy. Now, villagers were full of praise for them, as it was widely realized that it was their voluntary work, taken up quietly in very difficult conditions, that had led to the government intervening so promptly and quickly with its own work.

I recently went to this village to speak to a group of these women gathered at the home of one of them Rajni Rajput. What I really liked about this group was their sense of togetherness, unity, and cooperation. Rajput and Dalit women women were sitting together and relating their various activities taken up with mutual cooperation for water conservation and village development. There was not the slightest hint of discrimination. Pointing to an elderly Dalit woman, Kushma Rajak, sitting next to her, Rajni said, “She is the most senior among us and an inspiration for us. When we were going to the river for voluntary work, she took the shovel and said, “I’ll dig while all of you will fill the sacks.” Her daughter in law Anjana also joined. All of us were together with unity, but she, being senior, was more in a leadership role.”

When I was sitting among them and taking notes, my heartfelt feeling was that it is such women who will create the new India, a country based on equality of all sections of society.

This village is a leading village in the work area of Parmarth, a voluntary organization which has created a cadre of women volunteers for water conservation and adequacy. These volunteers are called Jal Sahelis, or ‘friends who work together on water-related issues’. or friends who work together on water related issues. There are ten Jal Sahelis in this village. These include representatives from various communities including Adivasis, who have played who have played a particularly valuable role in the planting and protection of trees.

Jal Sahelis hold regular meetings to take forward various water-related tasks. They are often joined by other members of their communities who take a keen interest in such initiatives. Together they constitute a pani panchayatVillage Water CouncilA non-formal, broader village organization or council that facilitates people’s participation in water and sanitation-related efforts and initiatives, often involving Jal Sahelis and other community members. ‘Pani’ means water, and ‘Panchayat’ refers to a village council. or a broader non-formal organization of the village that facilitates people’s participation in water- and sanitation-related efforts and initiatives.

As Shivani, a senior manager of Parmarth, asserts, the participation of women in rural development is important, but in addition, their leadership role should also be strengthened so that the priorities as seen by women of any village can also be taken forward.

Parmarth has an important project to advance this objective, particularly in the context of water, called Women for Water (WoW). This project advances the leadership role of women with trainings and capacity building, adding to the confidence as well as capabilities of Jal Sahelis and emerging women leaders elected to various levels of rural decentralization or Panchayati RajLocal Self-Government SystemA system of local self-government in India at the village, block, and district levels, designed to promote decentralization and grassroots democracy.. Apart from water and sanitation, other aspects of rural development, like health and education, are also taken up in these trainings. The results are already showing up in improved development indicators.

Athondhna is an important village for the WoW project. Neelam Jha, the local cluster coordinator of this project, says that women volunteers here have played an important role in ensuring hand-pump repairs and the proper spread of water pipelines. Now, water supply in all taps is eagerly awaited in the greater part of the village, and Jal Sahelis will be monitoring the progress carefully to ensure that no one is left out of the reach of water supply.

As part of this initiative, Reena Rajput has taken up important responsibilities in this and other villages to help villagers, and particularly women, to avail the benefits of various government schemes to which they are entitled but which they have not been able to access due to some problem or another. This effort has been particularly active in improving access to pensions for elderly women and widows.

Every civilization has faced the question of who should govern, and on what terms? The answer has always carried an implied demand that those who hold power possess the discipline, judgment, and constitutional restraint necessary to exercise it lawfully. Classical political thought approached that problem by tying authority to virtue. PlatoAncient Greek PhilosopherA student of Socrates and teacher of Aristotle, Plato’s political philosophy, particularly in ‘The Republic,’ argued that legitimacy in governance should be tied to wisdom and the rule of philosopher-kings. located legitimacy in wisdom, AristotleAncient Greek PhilosopherA student of Plato, Aristotle’s political thought emphasized practical reason directed towards the common good, analyzing various forms of government and their potential for justice and stability. in practical reason directed to the common good, and the Roman republican traditionPolitical PhilosophyA tradition emphasizing civic virtue, public service, and the idea that holding public office is a trust for the common good, rather than a means for personal gain or power. treated office as a public trust rather than a private possession. Modern constitutional democracy did not abandon that premise; it modified the method of selection while retaining the expectation that public power should be entrusted to persons capable of acting within law.

That is why constitutional design has never rested on trust in individual goodness alone. Madison’s warningJames Madison’s QuoteRefers to James Madison’s Federalist Paper No. 51, where he famously stated, ‘If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.’ It underscores the need for checks and balances due to human fallibility. that government must be administered by human beings rather than angels captures the basic point with precision. Power must therefore be divided, checked, and made answerable to law, not because institutions are perfect, but because persons are not. The constitutional order survives only so long as office is understood as a responsibility to institutions, not as a licence to use institutions as instruments of personal ambition.

For much of the twentieth century, representative politics broadly reflected that understanding. Parties generally preferred candidates with administrative experience, legislative competence, professional standing, or at least a record of public service. Patronage, corruption, and violence were never absent, but they were treated as departures from the norm, rather than as political assets. Power still had to be defended in constitutional language, even when its exercise fell short of constitutional ideals.

That arrangement now appears less secure. In a growing number of democracies, visibility has begun to outrank competence, confrontation to outrank deliberation, and personal force to outrank institutional restraint. The leader who dominates the conversation may be valued more highly than the leader who governs carefully. In such a climate, restraint can begin to look like weakness, while displays of command are mistaken for constitutional seriousness.

The deeper difficulty is not the existence of flawed leaders; democracies have always produced them. The difficulty arises when political incentives begin to reward the very characteristics constitutional government was designed to regulate. Criminal proceedings cease to operate as liabilities; institutional conflict becomes a badge of courage; and personal intervention is celebrated over orderly process. At that point, the pathology of power begins to take hold.

This is not a story of sudden collapse. It is a story of gradual incentive change. Political actors adapt to what voters reward, and voters respond to the political culture in which they are situated. If strength, confrontation, and personal dominance are consistently presented as marks of leadership, then parties will rationally continue to nominate those who embody such traits. The result is not irrational politics; it is distorted constitutional selection.

India provides a particularly revealing setting for this inquiry because its electoral framework requires unusually extensive disclosure of criminal antecedentsLegal TermRefers to a person’s past criminal record or history, including any previous arrests, charges, or convictions., assets, and educational qualifications. That disclosure regime makes visible a problem that may be easier to conceal elsewhere: the extent to which political success can become detached from constitutional aptitude. It also shows why the question is not merely about individual wrongdoing, but about the conditions that make certain candidates electorally attractive in the first place.

The answer lies in the accumulation of different forms of political capital. Financial resources matter because elections are expensive and candidates who can finance themselves reduce the burden on parties. Organizational strength matters because local networks, patronage structures, and informal influence often matter more than policy competence. Symbolic capital matters because public controversy, media attention, and the image of fearlessness can translate into electoral advantage even where legal proceedings are pending or unresolved.

This creates a troubling paradox. Conduct that should ordinarily damage a political career may instead enhance it. A criminal case may be recast as evidence of persecution. Institutional confrontation may be sold as courage. Visibility may matter more than legality, and public resilience more than constitutional propriety. The distinction between constitutional legitimacy and political legitimacy begins to widen, and once that happens, the incentives of representative politics begin to shift in a systematic way.

Judicial intervention can improve transparency, but it cannot by itself alter the underlying market. Mandatory disclosures, public explanations for candidate selection, and electoral accountability are valuable reforms, but they do not automatically change what voters reward. Nor do they fully overcome the problem of delay, which allows pending proceedings to become politically useful while accountability remains deferred. In that interval, uncertainty itself becomes a resource.

The implications are serious for legislatures as institutions. A legislature selected primarily for visibility and dominance may continue to function formally while losing deliberative quality. That is not an argument against democracy or for technocracy. It is simply a reminder that representative institutions are meant to do more than produce governments; they are meant to scrutinise power, deliberate upon law, and preserve constitutional balance. When electoral incentives reward spectacle more than substance, those functions weaken.

The same concern appears in the growing performance of power outside ordinary institutional channels. A constitutionally organized state distributes authority among the legislature, executive, police, regulators, and courts. When political actors intervene publicly in matters that belong to those institutions, the message is not merely about the immediate incident. It suggests that visible authority may displace lawful process. The performance itself becomes politically valuable, even when it undermines the separation of functions on which constitutional government depends.

This is why public interventions against citizens, officials, journalists, lawyers, or others who play a constitutional role are not trivial matters. They may be framed as isolated incidents, but their symbolic force is broader. They communicate that personal power can substitute for institutional decision-making. They also encourage the perception that law follows influence, rather than the other way around. Over time, that perception weakens confidence in constitutional procedure and strengthens dependence on patronage.

Violence or intimidation directed at institutions with constitutional significance is especially corrosive. Lawyers, judges, journalists, academics, and civil servants are not merely private individuals in such settings; they are participants in the system through which power is checked. Attacks on them are therefore not only criminal acts. They are also signals that the channels of scrutiny and accountability are being pressured by force, intimidation, or spectacle.

A comparable danger exists when opposition or criticism is treated as disloyalty. Representative democracy depends on the legitimacy of disagreement. Governments govern; they do not acquire immunity from criticism. Where opposition is reclassified as hostility and scrutiny as subversion, the constitutional balance begins to shift. The problem is not confined to any one ideology or party. It is a structural tendency that emerges whenever electoral incentives favor concentration of authority over constitutional forbearancePolitical NormThe practice of exercising self-restraint in the use of institutional power, even when legally permissible, to uphold democratic norms and preserve the spirit of the constitution..

The broader comparison is important. Democratic decline rarely begins with the formal abolition of elections or courts. It begins with the slow weakening of conventions, habits, and restraints. Each departure may seem small in isolation. Together, they alter the political baseline. An unchallenged breach becomes normal; a normal breach becomes expected. That is how constitutional erosion often proceeds in practice.

The Broken ‘Windows’ analogy helps explain the process. In criminal theory, visible disorder sends a signal that rules are not being enforced, which can invite further disorder. Transposed to constitutional life, the insight is similar: repeated tolerance of minor departures from institutional discipline can weaken public confidence in the system as a whole. The point is not zero tolerance in a punitive sense. The point is that constitutional legitimacy depends on visible consistency, not merely formal legality.

That is why isolated incidents should not be the only focus. The real issue is the cumulative effect. One delayed criminal case, one dramatic intervention, one ignored convention, one politicized investigation, one weak response to institutional impropriety may each be defensible on its own facts. But taken together, they can slowly reshape what citizens regard as acceptable political conduct. When that happens, constitutional decline becomes culturally embedded before it becomes formally visible.

India’s constitutional resilience remains substantial. Elections are vigorous, institutions continue to operate, and civil society remains active. None of this suggests collapse. But resilience should not obscure pressure. A system can remain formally intact while its constitutional habits deteriorate. The danger is not immediate rupture; it is gradual normalization of conduct that once would have been viewed as incompatible with responsible government.

The final constitutional question is therefore simple, even if the answer is difficult. Do democratic institutions continue to reward those best suited to exercise power responsibly, or do they increasingly reward those best able to display, acquire, and preserve power regardless of constitutional restraint? If the latter tendency continues, the law will not disappear overnight. It will be displaced slowly, one incentive at a time, until the culture of office changes from stewardship to domination.

The task of constitutional renewal is therefore not only to punish misuse after the fact but to restore the political value of restraint before erosion becomes entrenched. A republic remains healthy only when power understands that its legitimacy comes from law, not personality. When that understanding weakens, the pathology of power has already begun.

Indian civil society possesses intellectual resources unmatched by most democracies. Its universities, bar associations, retired judges, former civil servants, constitutional scholars, journalists, scientists, entrepreneurs, armed forces veterans, social workers, and professional institutions collectively represent an extraordinary reservoir of experience and public credibility.

Their influence need not be confined to criticism after elections. They can contribute before elections by helping transform the quality of democratic choice itself. One possible institutional innovation would be the establishment of a broad, independent and non-partisan national civic forum dedicated exclusively to constitutional governance. Its function would not be to become another political party. Nor would it seek executive office. Its purpose would instead be to evaluate prospective candidates according to publicly announced constitutional criteria: integrity, demonstrated public service, professional accomplishment, legislative aptitude, constitutional literacy, financial transparency, respect for the rule of law and commitment to democratic institutions.

Its assessments would possess no legal force. Their authority would derive solely from credibility, transparency, and intellectual independence. Where political parties nominate candidates who satisfy those standards, the forum could publicly acknowledge them irrespective of party affiliation. Where parties fail to do so, the forum could encourage capable and respected independent candidates to enter public life with organized civic support.

Such candidates would possess neither vast financial resources nor entrenched organizational structures. Many would lose. Some would eventually succeed. However, the presence of even a small number of legislators distinguished by constitutional understanding, professional accomplishment, and intellectual independence can materially improve legislative discourse. Parliament has never depended exclusively upon numbers. It has always depended upon the quality of voices capable of questioning assumptions, demanding evidence, exposing constitutional infirmities, and reminding governments that electoral mandates are broad but never unlimited.

Every enduring constitutional transformation began as a minority position. The abolition of slavery, universal adult suffrage, judicial review, freedom of the press, equality before law, and constitutional limitations upon executive authority all entered public life through minorities willing to defend principles before those principles commanded majorities.

The strength of a constitutional democracy lies in the diversity of informed voices participating in its deliberations. Governments will continue to change. Parties will continue to rise and decline. The constitutional objective is to ensure that whoever governs remains governed by the Constitution. India frequently describes itself as the world’s largest democracy.

Civilizational leadership is demonstrated when power voluntarily accepts restraint, when institutions command greater loyalty than personalities, when disagreement is protected, when minorities seek justice with confidence, and when governments understand that constitutional limits do not diminish authority but legitimize it. The true measure of a republic is whether an ordinary citizen, unknown, powerless, and unconnected, can stand before the might of the State confident that justice, based on Constitutional rights, will prevail. When that begins to disappear, the pathology of power has taken root.

History will not ultimately ask whether a nation elected strong leaders. History will ask a far more enduring question. Did power remain accountable to law, or did law gradually become accountable to power?

Jai Hind.

As I soon realized in the course of a discussion with villagers, most of the able young men and several women as well have migrated in search of work to cities like Delhi and Surat. A quick estimate provided by the people of this village in Banda districtBanda DistrictA district in the Uttar Pradesh state of India, part of the Chitrakoot Division. of Uttar Pradesh was that about one-fifth of the inhabitants are still in the village while the remaining have migrated. The reason for such large-scale migration forced on people is that their main livelihood source has been badly disrupted over the last five years.

This is a village of the Kevat community which has been celebrated in mythological literature. However, today the people of this village are living in extreme poverty. They need their basic needs like a proper path and a village school to be met. Housing conditions need improvement. However, perhaps the biggest cause of their declining economic condition is the big loss of traditional livelihoods during the last five years or so. Their traditional livelihoodss have been closely related to the Ken riverKen RiverA major river in the Bundelkhand region of central India, flowing through Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. of Bundelkhand regionBundelkhand RegionA geographical and cultural region in central India, divided between the states of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, known for its historical significance and often facing drought challenges. which flows close to this village, near the border of Uttar Pradesh with Madhya Pradesh.

The most common source of livelihood for this community has been growing diverse vegetables in the fertile land of the riverside plains, as well as fruits like watermelons. This community is highly skilled in this work and until just a few years back, provided high-quality vegetables and fruits to a wide region. These vegetables were highly relished by people, and special orders for marriages and other social functions were also placed here. Villagers had plenty of high-nutrition vegetables for their own consumption, and they also exchanged their vegetables with other farmers to get food grains needed by them.

However, about five years back, a significant change came when big river sand mining machines entered the riverbank area. Highly excessive and indiscriminate sand mining took place in the river. The entire area was badly ravaged in the process. While the sand was carried away, debris was deposited recklessly on the riverbank. The riverside changed drastically in a short time. There was no possibility of cultivation of vegetables here now. As mining advanced to another area after ravaging the earlier one, destruction in the next zone started in a similar manner.

Thus, within about five years, the entire livelihood base of the people of the Kevat community, well-known for its highly skilled vegetable cultivation, was destroyed. This is why they have become so highly dependent on migration. Just for the one-time high profits of a very small number of highly powerful persons, the sustainable livelihoods of Many villages like Bodepurva have been sacrificed. Livelihoods that could have continued for many more decades have been destroyed, and the supply of high-nutrition vegetables from these villages has stopped or decreased considerably.

Apart from visiting this village, I also went to the riverbank area where this vegetable cultivation was taking place earlier until just a few years back. The entire landscape looked ravaged, with mining debris deposited here and there, and some stagnant pools had also formed. While earlier people used to visit the riverbank here regularly, treating it like a second home as they spent nights in huts protecting crops from animals, now it has become a dangerous and inhospitable place. Certain mined portions can be highly risky, particularly for children. The link of villagers with their mother river has been badly disrupted in a cruel way.

The river ecology has also been badly disrupted; with the removal of river sand, its ability to maintain a more steady flow has been harmed. It can deplete at a faster pace in the dry season and can cause more ravage in the flood season. Water quality deteriorates with sand removal, with pit formation at places disrupting free flow. This has an adverse effect on fish and other river life, as well as on wild and domestic animals drinking river water. Birds, including migratory birds, find riverbanks to be much less hospitable than before. These various indirect impacts are also harmful to the people of Bodepurva and other similarly affected villages, apart from the more direct livelihood loss they have suffered. There are Many villages suffering such harm. Can our country progress in this way? All this may be shown as an increase in GNP, but can this truly be called progress?, but can be this be called progress?

Balancing the Perspective

Mahbubani refrains from offering a blunt answer to the provocative question posed in his title. Instead, he adopts the role of a candid yet considerate friend of America, one who seeks to inform and gently warn. He urges the United States to reconsider its approach toward China, while simultaneously encouraging China to acknowledge its own shortcomings with tact. The result is a work that is serious, balanced, and deeply thought-provoking.

Negativity in Strategic Objectives

Under President Trump, the United States initiated a trade war with China, though its policy objectives remain ambiguous. From America’s words and actions, three aims appear evident:

• To prevent China from becoming the world’s largest economy.
• To weaken or ultimately overturn the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party.
• To contain or, if possible, eliminate China’s growing global influence.

Decline is Surfacing

The United States enjoys unparalleled geographic advantages and is firmly rooted in Western civilization. For over two centuries, it has been the flagbearer of rationalist intellectual traditions and the champion of democracy and an open society. Its institutions remain strong, and its universities, Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and California among them, continue to attract the brightest minds worldwide. Yet Mahbubani observes that since 1980 America has experienced steady decline. While it is incomparably richer than China in per capita incomePer Capita IncomeThe average income earned per person in a given area (city, region, country) in a specified year, calculated by dividing the total income by the total population., the earnings of its bottom 50 percent have stagnated or fallen, even as China’s have risen significantly. Moreover, China is now outpacing the United States in government investment in research and innovation.

Mahbubani also draws a striking historical comparison. During the Cold War, the United States confronted the Soviet Union with strategic patience, confidence, and ideological clarity. He argues that America now risks exhibiting the very hubris and overconfidence that once characterized the Soviet leadership. China, on the other hand, has pursued a markedly different path. China has been focusing on economic modernization, pragmatic statecraft, and long-term strategic planning rather than ideological confrontation. Containing the dragon is simply impossible!

Outdated Mindset

America’s greatest strategic mistake, Mahbubani argues, is that it is attempting to fight the challenges of the twenty-first century with the mindset and methods of the twentieth. Washington increasingly portrays China as a grave military threat, but does the evidence justify this perception? The facts suggest otherwise. The United States possesses more than 2,000 combat aircraft and maintains approximately 800 military bases across the globe. China, by comparison, has around 600 combat aircraft and only three overseas military bases. Its annual defense budget, at roughly US$250 billion, is less than one-third of that of the United States. If America continues to allocate enormous resources to countering what it perceives as an imminent Chinese military threat, Mahbubani observes, Chinese strategists should only be glad to see such a costly diversion of American valuable resources.

Has China ever directly challenged America’s prosperity? The answer is no. Mahbubani advises China not to place undue pressure on American corporations investing there and stresses the importance of training local officials at the grassroots level. Indeed, it was the U.S. economy that enabled China’s transformation from an economy ten times smaller in 1980 to one that surpassed America’s in size by 2014. These corporations could play a crucial role in mitigating any U.S. military or political aggression against China.

Short Termism in Action

The United States, Mahbubani contends, is undermining its global position by prioritizing short-term goals over long-term strategy. A striking example is the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear agreement of 2015, signed under President Obama with the support of permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany. This accord represented a constructive attempt to resolve a regional dispute. Yet under President Trump, the United States unilaterally withdrew, imposed sanctions, and penalized countries trading with Iran. The result was a legal and diplomatic debacle: European nations began exploring non-dollar mechanisms for trade. The dollar has long been one of the principal pillars of America’s global influence. For decades, most countries viewed America’s dominance of the international financial system as acceptable because the United States was regarded as a responsible steward of the global economy. Today, however, that perception is changing. American foreign policy has become increasingly unpredictable, reducing international confidence. America’s aggressive handling of the Iran issue may have weakened one of its greatest strategic assets i.e. the global dominance of the dollar. As confidence erodes, the world will naturally search for alternatives. The Chinese renminbiRenminbi (RMB)The official currency of the People’s Republic of China, often referred to interchangeably with the yuan, which is the basic unit of the renminbi. is an obvious candidate, and should China successfully introduce a credible blockchain-based digital currencyBlockchain-Based Digital CurrencyA form of currency that exists purely in digital form and uses blockchain technology for secure, decentralized, and transparent transactions, like cryptocurrencies., a large number of countries are likely to embrace it.

Is China Expansionist?

Mahbubani raises the critical question of whether China is expansionist. Except for disputes over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and its border with India, China has shown little inclination toward military aggression. Unlike the Soviet Union, it has no ambition to export communism or impose its system abroad. China presents itself as a credible and inclusive power. Without engaging in major military interventions abroad, China has steadily advanced towards a position of global leadership through trade, investment, and economic cooperation. The Belt and Road Initiative exemplifies this strategy. By 2019, 137 countries had supported the initiative, reflecting China’s growing international influence. Increasingly, governments around the world are preparing for the possibility that China may eventually become the world’s No 1 power.

Democracy and China

Perhaps the book’s most thought-provoking discussion concerns democracy in China. Should China necessarily adopt Western-style democracy? Mahbubani approaches this question with considerable caution. Although China lacks a liberal democratic system, it has simultaneously experienced one of the most remarkable periods of economic growth and social transformation in human history. Among the world’s ancient civilizations, Chinese civilization occupies a unique place. It has suffered repeated periods of decline throughout its history, yet it has consistently demonstrated an extraordinary capacity for renewal and resurgence. As Mahbubani describes, the Chinese people have been experiencing a life in the most prosperous four decades in their four-thousand-year long civilizational history. He therefore argues that the Chinese Communist Party should be more accurately termed as Chinese Civilization Party. Given the remarkable improvements in living standards and the broad public satisfaction with China’s system of governance, there exists little prospect of the CCP being removed from power. This raises a profound question: should outsiders presume to judge a political system that appears to enjoy substantial domestic legitimacy and support?

Reading the book in June 2026 in the aftermath of the Middle East war is particularly fascinating. The geopolitical developments surrounding the Gulf crisis and the events that followed have, in many respects, reinforced Mahbubani’s central arguments. America today looks less powerful and more constrained than before, while China’s global influence continues to expand. This book is both compelling and sobering, offering eye-opening insights into the future of global power dynamics. While it may seem dense to the casual reader, it is indispensable for students and scholars of geopoliticsGeopoliticsThe study of the influence of geography (human and physical) on international politics and international relations. and geoeconomicsGeoeconomicsThe study of the use of economic tools and strategies to achieve geopolitical objectives, often involving trade, investment, and financial policies..