J&K&L HC Calls For Stricter Jail Times And Heavier Penalties For Animal Cruelty

Needless to say, it cannot be just glossed over that the Division Bench propounds in para 12 holding that, “It is trite law, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 and Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14, that preventive detention cannot be used as a substitute for ordinary law of the land and that when a person is already in custody, detaining authority must, on the basis of cogent material, be satisfied that there is a real possibility of his release and of his indulging in prejudicial activities thereafter. No such satisfaction is discernible from the impugned order of detention. The learned Writ Court has glossed over this vital aspect of the matter.”

Be it noted, the Division Bench notes in para 13 that, “Similarly, the fact that appellant/detenu had been admitted to bail in connection with case FIR no.55/2025 by competent court, and his bail application in FIR no.121/2025 dismissed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Anantnag, was pending before this Court at the time of passing of the impugned order of detention, in which he having been subsequently admitted to bail on 16th February 2026, finds no mention in the grounds of detention. The detaining authority has not shown any awareness of bail granted in FIR no.55/2025 and dismissal of bail application in FIR no.121/2025. In Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed a detention order in identical circumstances, holding that where the detaining authority was not even aware whether the bail application of the accused was pending, the subjective satisfaction stands vitiated and detention order cannot be sustained.”

Quite glaringly, we need to note that the Division Bench then notes in para 14 that, “Yet another infirmity which strikes at the root of the impugned detention order is that it wrongly mentions five Sections of the BNS, i.e., 109, 126(2), 115(2), 309(4), 351(3) as having been invoked in FIR no.121/2025, whereas the FIR contains only three Sections, i.e., 109, 126(2) and 309(4). Such a patent factual error, going to the very substance of allegations against detenu, palpably establishes that detaining authority acted mechanically on police dossier without applying its independent mind. This also seriously prejudiced the constitutional right of detenu to make an effective representation against his detention as guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. In terms of Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack, AIR 1969 SC 43, a detention order founded on factually incorrect material is unsustainable in law.”

It cannot be lost on us that the Division Bench while citing the relevant case law points out in para 15 that, “So far as the delay in execution of detention is concerned, though the detention order was passed on 01.12.2025, yet it was executed only on 19.12.2025. The respondents have failed to furnish any explanation for this unexplained delay of 18 days. The learned Writ Court has, however, confined the issue merely to the fact that the grounds of detention were supplied on the same day on which the warrant was executed, without examining the unexplained delay in execution of order of detention itself, more particularly when the detenu was available and in custody in connection with case FIR no.121/2025. Such unexplained delay severs live and proximate link between alleged prejudicial activities and necessity of preventive detention and renders detention illegal, as held in by the Supreme Court in Sk. Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 4 SCC 358.”

Most forthrightly, the Division Bench underscores in para 16 holding emphatically that, “What, however, tilts the scales conclusively against respondents is the material on the detention record itself which reveals that before passing impugned order of detention, District Magistrate, Anantnag, had already written a letter to Director General of Prisons (DGP) with regard to the jails, pursuant to which the office of the Director General of Prisons, J&K, issued a communication no.DS/PSA dated 26th November 2025, specifically directing that appellant/detenu be lodged at District Jail, Bhaderwah, under preventive detention laws. The said communication was issued on the very same day as the proposal of District Magistrate and five days prior to passing of order of detention dated 1st December 2025, whereas detention order itself came to be executed on 19th December 2025. Issuance of a prison allotment direction, pursuant to the letter of detaining authority, much before detention order was even passed, unmistakably establishes that the decision to detain appellant had already been taken in advance and that the detention order was passed as a mere formality. This reflects gross non-application of mind on the part of detaining authority and demonstrates that subjective satisfaction, mandated under the Act of 1978, was neither genuine nor independently arrived at. The impugned detention order is, therefore, vitiated in law.”

Most remarkably, the Division Bench propounds in para 17 holding explicitly that, “Before parting with the judgment, we consider it necessary to observe that India’s animal protection laws have changed over time. These changes show how relationship between humans and animals has evolved, and how people’s views on animal care have also shifted. The idea of protecting animals in India is very old. Ancient legal texts and religious scriptures taught people to treat animals with kindness. Two important ideas from Indian thought are “Ahimsa”, viz. non-violence, and “Dharma” viz. duty. These ideas still shape how people in India see animals. Cows, elephants, and buffalo are respected in a special way, which is a unique part of Indian culture. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, was a very important law. It was made to stop unnecessary pain and suffering to animals. This law also gave police and other officials the power to punish people who are cruel to animals.”

It is worth noting that the Division Bench notes in para 18 that, “Besides, the smuggling of bovine animals is not only a criminal offence but it is also an act which hurts the religious sentiments of the largest population of India. Such activities, if established against any person, are highly objectionable and have the potential to disturb public tranquillity, and, therefore, the law enforcement agencies are expected to deal with such offenders with a firm hand in accordance with law.”

Plainly speaking, the Division Bench candidly concedes in para 19 underscoring that, “The animals also feel pain, stress, and fear just like humans do, but our legal system still treats them like objects or property instead of living beings. Because of this, the rules made to protect them are extremely weak.”

Most significantly, most rationally and most commendably, the Division Bench encapsulates in para 20 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “It is under India’s main animal protection law written back in 1960, viz. Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, that someone who tortures, beats, or kills an animal can be fined as little as 10 to 50 rupees. Since these fines are so low, there is almost no fear of the law, which is why we see people committing acts of abuse just to post videos on social media for views. While the courts have agreed that animals deserve to live without suffering, the written law has not changed enough yet. For real change to happen, the law needs to officially recognize the animal feelings and replace those tiny fines with strict jail time and heavy penalties.”

Most remarkably, the Division Bench underscores in para 21 holding aptly that, “Now coming to the case in hand, even in respect of such activities, the constitutional safeguards governing preventive detention are mandatory and not directory, and any infraction thereof vitiates the detention. The answer to such criminality lies in diligent and expeditious prosecution under the ordinary criminal law and not in throwing to winds the procedural safeguards enshrined under Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution.”

Most dispassionately, it would be instructive to note that the Division Bench hastens to add in para 22 noting that, “Viewed from any angle, we do not find the impugned order passed by the Writ Court sustainable in law.”

Resultantly, the Division Bench then directs and holds in para 23 that, “For all these reasons, we find merit in this appeal, and the same is accordingly allowed. Resultantly the petition, being HCP no.01/2026 is also allowed and the order of detention bearing no.32/DMA/PSA/DET/ 2025 dated 1st December 2025, passed by the District Magistrate, Anantnag, is quashed. The appellant shall be set at liberty, if he is not required in any other case.”

Finally, the Division Bench then concludes aptly by holding in para 24 that, “Disposed of along with connected CM(s).”

To conclude, the Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has caught the right pulse in calling upon for stricter jail times and so also heavier penalties for those who commit animal cruelty as the existing laws are wholly inadequate and so usually are taken for granted. For this to happen, there is undoubtedly a dire need for legislative reform and it was underscored most emphatically by the Srinagar High Court that the law should formally recognize animal feelings and replace nominal fines with stricter punishment, including imprisonment and heavier penalties. Absolutely right! No denying or disputing it! It definitely brooks no more delay any longer now!