Opening The Rift
© 2026 The Rift. All Rights Reserved.

Court rules that 80% prior consent of affected families is compulsory for land acquisition for private companies; holds that mining lease cannot override statutory safeguards under the 2013 Land Acquisition Act
New Delhi | Bhubaneswar : In a significant judgment concerning land acquisition, tribal rights and statutory safeguards in Scheduled AreasConstitutional ProvisionAreas in India identified under the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution, primarily inhabited by tribal communities, where special provisions apply for administration and protection of tribal rights., the Supreme Court of India has set aside the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the Odisha Government for facilitating mining operations by Dalmia Cement Bharat Limited in Sundargarh district.
The Court held that acquisition of land by the State for a private company, even for a public purpose such as mining, attracts the mandatory requirement of obtaining prior consent from at least 80% of the affected families under Section 2(2)(b) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
The Bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma delivered the judgment on November 18, 2026, in Bibol Toppo & Ors. v. State of Odisha & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 8294 of 2026 (2026 INSC 1244).
Justice Satish Chandra Sharma authored the judgment.
The appeal arose from land acquisition proceedings initiated by the Odisha Government at the instance of Dalmia Cement Bharat Limited for acquiring surface rights over approximately 273.57 hectares of agricultural land situated in three villages—Kukuda, Bihabandha and Lanjiberna—in Sundargarh district.
The company already held mining rights over the larger area under a mining lease extended until February 29, 2040. However, it required surface rights over the concerned land to undertake mining operations.
The acquisition process was initiated under the 2013 Land Acquisition Act. Administrative approval was granted by the State Government in August 2017, expressly subject to compliance with the prior consent requirement under Section 2(2)(b)(i) of the Act.
Importantly, the concerned Gram Panchayats had passed unanimous resolutions on January 26, 2020, rejecting the proposed acquisition.
Subsequently, the State proceeded with the acquisition process, including the issuance of notifications under the 2013 Act.
The affected villagers challenged the proceedings before the Orissa High Court. However, their writ petition was dismissed on September 6, 2024, prompting them to approach the Supreme Court.
One of the principal questions before the Supreme Court was whether the acquisition fell under Section 2(1) or Section 2(2)(b) of the 2013 Act.
While Section 2(1) deals with acquisition by the Government for its own use, hold and control, Section 2(2)(b) specifically addresses acquisition by the Government for private companies for public purposes.
The respondents argued that the acquisition was undertaken by the State for a public purpose and that ownership of the acquired land would vest in the State.
Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court held that the determining factor was the dominant purpose for which the land was being acquired and not merely the fact that the acquisition was formally undertaken by the Government.
The Court observed that the acquisition was exclusively intended to facilitate mining operations by a private company, which already possessed mining rights over the area.
Consequently, Section 2(2)(b) of the 2013 Act was applicable.
The Bench emphasised that the provision requires prior consent of at least 80% of the affected families in cases involving acquisition for private companies.
It further clarified that such consent must be obtained along with the Social Impact Assessment (SIA) study and before the Government examines the acquisition proposal under Section 8 of the Act.
The Court rejected the State’s contention that consent could be obtained at different stages throughout the acquisition process.
It held that treating consent as a continuing process would defeat the legislative purpose of requiring prior consent.
The judgment also noted that Rule 21 of the Odisha Land Acquisition Rules requires consent to be obtained in the prescribed Form J.
The State had claimed that consent had been obtained from 482 affected families. However, the Supreme Court found that no material had been produced to establish that such consent was obtained in the prescribed manner or was available at the legally required stage.
A significant aspect of the judgment concerns the interpretation of Section 41(3) of the 2013 Act, which provides special protection for land situated in Scheduled Areas.
The Supreme Court noted that the acquired land fell within the Scheduled Area of Sundargarh district, Odisha, attracting the constitutional safeguards under the Fifth Schedule.
Section 41(3) requires prior consent of the concerned Gram Sabha, Panchayat or Autonomous District Council, as applicable, before issuing a notification for land acquisition in Scheduled Areas.
The respondents had argued that the requirement was merely directory and that non-compliance should not invalidate the acquisition proceedings.
The High Court had also taken the view that the requirement of prior consent could not be treated as mandatory in every situation.
Disagreeing with this interpretation, the Supreme Court held that Section 41 contains three distinct statutory safeguards:
Section 41(1) provides that, as far as possible, acquisition of land in Scheduled Areas should be avoided.
Section 41(2) requires that any such acquisition must be undertaken only as a demonstrable last resort.
Section 41(3) mandates prior consent of the concerned Gram Sabha before the issuance of an acquisition notification.
The Court clarified that the expressions “as far as possible” and “demonstrable last resort” appearing in the first two sub-sections cannot be used to dilute the mandatory requirement contained in Section 41(3).
It categorically held that prior consent under Section 41(3) is mandatory and cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality.
The Court further noted that the concerned Gram Sabhas had expressly rejected the proposed acquisition through resolutions passed on January 26, 2020. Despite this rejection, the acquisition proceedings had continued.
The Bench observed that the absence of the prescribed Gram Sabha consent could not be dismissed as an inconsequential irregularity.
While examining the legislative intent behind Section 41, the Supreme Court referred to the constitutional protection afforded to Scheduled Areas under the Fifth Schedule.
The Court highlighted that these safeguards are intended to protect the interests of communities residing in such areas, particularly in matters concerning their land and livelihoods.
It also referred to the 24th Report of the Standing Committee on Rural Development and Panchayati Raj (2025–26), which expressed concern over instances where Gram Sabha consent is obtained merely as a paper formality without meaningful participation of affected communities.
The Court emphasised that statutory requirements designed to secure community participation cannot be reduced to procedural formalities.
The Supreme Court also examined the objections concerning the Social Impact Assessment process.
A public hearing on the draft SIA report had been scheduled for April 16, 2021, in the affected villages.
However, the appellants relied upon information obtained under the Right to Information Act indicating that no public hearing could actually be conducted due to COVID-19 restrictions.
The respondents contended that the hearing had taken place but could not be properly recorded because of non-cooperation and disturbances by some villagers.
The Court found that there was no material establishing that the required public hearing had actually taken place.
It also noted that the views and concerns of affected persons were not reflected in the final SIA report, thereby undermining the statutory purpose of public consultation.
The Bench observed that the public hearing requirement is intended to ensure that the concerns of affected persons are placed before the Expert Group and the appropriate Government for meaningful consideration.
Another important issue concerned the composition of the Expert Group constituted to evaluate the Social Impact Assessment report.
The appellants questioned the inclusion of Mr. Ashok Kumar Sahoo, who was connected with the project proponent, Dalmia Cement Bharat Limited, in the capacity of Advisor, Land Acquisition.
The respondents defended his inclusion by arguing that Section 7 of the 2013 Act permits the inclusion of technical experts and does not prescribe an exhaustive composition of the Expert Group.
The Supreme Court, however, emphasised that Section 7(1) expressly requires the SIA report to be evaluated by an independent multidisciplinary Expert Group.
The Court held that although technical experts may form part of the Group, their inclusion cannot compromise the statutory requirement of independence.
It observed that a person having a direct financial and professional connection with the project proponent could not reasonably be expected to provide an independent assessment of whether the project served the public interest or involved disproportionate social costs.
In particularly strong observations, the Court held that the inclusion of the company-linked member compromised the independence of the Expert Group and rendered its deliberations akin to a “fixed match”.
Accordingly, the Court found a violation of Section 7 of the 2013 Act.
The Supreme Court also examined the relationship between the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act) and the 2013 Land Acquisition Act.
The respondents argued that the MMDR Act comprehensively governs mining operations and that the mining lease entitled the company to undertake mining activities upon payment of compensation to surface-right holders.
The Court rejected the attempt to treat the mining lease as overriding the statutory requirements governing land acquisition.
It clarified that the two legislations operate in distinct spheres.
While the MMDR Act regulates mining leases, mineral concessions and the relationship between the State and the mining lessee, the 2013 Act governs the acquisition of land, compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement.
The Court held that the existence of a mining lease cannot extinguish or override the proprietary rights of third-party landowners.
It further clarified that Section 24A of the MMDR Act, which provides for compensation for loss or damage caused during mining operations, cannot be interpreted to mean that a mining lessee may commence mining operations on any land merely by paying compensation to the occupier.
The Court distinguished compensation for damage caused during mining operations from compensation payable for acquisition of land.
It held that the respondents could not rely upon the MMDR Act to defend an acquisition process that had been initiated under the 2013 Act but carried out in violation of its mandatory requirements.
The Supreme Court also dealt with the objection concerning the appellants’ locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings.
The State had questioned their connection with the acquired land and argued that they had failed to establish the necessary relationship with the recorded landowners.
The Court observed that the State could not question the appellants’ locus standi after failing to discharge its own statutory obligation to update the Record of Rights during the acquisition process.
It further noted that at least one appellant’s name was admittedly reflected in the Record of Rights, but his locus had been questioned on account of the absence of his signature in the affidavit.
The Court observed that the High Court could have directed the concerned appellant to furnish a fresh affidavit instead of outrightly rejecting the claim on a curable technical defect.
The Bench emphasised that when the State is found to have committed statutory violations, a constitutional court should not dismiss a challenge solely on technical grounds, particularly where the defect could have been cured.
After examining the statutory violations, the Supreme Court concluded that the land acquisition proceedings could not be sustained in law.
The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquisition proceedings along with the relevant notifications and orders, and quashed the impugned judgment of the Orissa High Court.
However, the Court clarified that its decision would not prevent the respondents from initiating a fresh land acquisition process in accordance with law and the findings recorded in the judgment.
The appeal was accordingly disposed of along with the pending applications, if any.
The judgment assumes considerable significance in the context of land acquisition for industrial and mining projects, particularly in Scheduled Areas.
It reinforces the principle that the statutory requirement of prior consent is not an empty formality but an essential safeguard intended to ensure meaningful participation of affected communities.
By clarifying that prior consent of 80% of affected families must be obtained at the prescribed stage, and that Gram Sabha consent under Section 41(3) is mandatory in Scheduled Areas, the Supreme Court has strengthened the legal protections available to communities affected by land acquisition.
The ruling also makes it clear that the grant of a mining lease cannot be used as a substitute for compliance with land acquisition legislation or as a means of overriding the proprietary rights of landowners.
Green Nobel Award-winning environmental activist Sri Prafulla Samantara, National Convenor of LokShakti Abhiyan, issued the following press statement welcoming the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment:
“Yesterday 18th November the Supreme court of India quashed the land acquisition by the government of Odisha for Dalmia Cement Company in Lanjiberna ,Kukuda Gram Panchayats of Sundargarh district and directed that consent of Gram Sabhas for land Acquisition and for approval of Social Impact Study is must Land Acquisition Act 2013 . In this historical judgement it is established that the tribal’ right as per the Constitutional provisions has to be honoured .I welcome this judgement overwhelmingly as it is another step forward to exercise the constitutional rights by the tribal communities on land and forest after the first historical judgement in 2013 on Niyamgiri mining issue that the Gram Sabha is supreme.
It is mandatory on the part of the all Governments to implement before acquisition or transfer or diversion of land and forest or any mining lease in the Scheduled Areas and a also in Non-Scheduled Area as per Land Acquisition Act 2013 consent of Gram Sabha in advance is must .
The Responsible Administrative officers responsible for violation of the Act and laws in regard of Land Acquisition for Dalmia be punished and those police officers and District Collector had directed to demolish 40 scares of crop land in the midnight in last year be accountable for the destruction of land.The Company has to restore the land for cultivation as soon as possible and compensation must be paid to the owners of land for loss of livelihood .It is a victory of tribals who have been resisting democratically to protect their right to life and livelihood based on land against mining in their land.
I do appeal to the Odisha Government to cancel all the mining leases and forced land acquisition and diversion of forests without consent of Gram Sabha in the state.If not intensive United people’ struggle will be inevitable to prevent arbitrary and forced take over natural resources for corporates.
In the interest of justice let all false criminal cases Against villagers be withdrawn.
Thanks to SC Senior advocate Sanjay Parikh who was pleading the case Bibal Topo and others Vs Odisha Govt.”
Case: Bibol Toppo & Ors. v. State of Odisha & Ors.
Citation: 2026 INSC 1244
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 8294 of 2026
Bench: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
Date of Judgment: November 18, 2026
Judgment authored by: Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
Primary judgment reference: Read the full judgment – Bibol Toppo v. State of Odisha (2026INSC 1244) .
Secondary reference : Read the full judgment – Bibol Toppo v. State of Odisha (2026INSC 1244) .
Disclaimer:The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of The Rift.



