The Courage to Break the Zionist Political Deadlock

Eisenkot must decide whether these conditions are intended to establish common democratic ground or to preserve a political distinction that Arab parties can never fully overcome.

Consider the demand for military or civilian service. A state may legitimately discuss how citizens contribute to public life. But a civilian-service framework must be genuinely voluntary or fairly designed, free from ethnic discrimination, and respectful of the historical and political circumstances of the communities concerned. It cannot become a disguised instrument for demanding political conformity.

Similarly, a commitment to democracy must mean more than accepting Israel’s existing constitutional identity. It must include protecting the rights of minorities, respecting lawful political opposition and accepting the legitimacy of elected representatives whose constituencies challenge prevailing national narratives.

If Arab parties are invited to participate only after demonstrating that they will not question any fundamental assumption of the Jewish political establishment, the invitation will be hollow.

Eisenkot has an opportunity to establish a different standard: not agreement on every question of national identity, but agreement on democratic government, equal citizenship, public accountability, civilian protection and a credible political future for Palestinians.

That would require negotiations conducted in good faith, with clearly defined responsibilities and enforceable commitments. It would also require Jewish opposition parties to explain to their own constituencies why political cooperation with Arab citizens is not a betrayal of Israel but a test of its democratic maturity.

Mansour Abbas and the difficult politics of accommodation

Mansour Abbas, leader of Ra’am, has already demonstrated that Arab political participation need not depend on the wholesale rejection of Israel’s existing state identity. He has acknowledged Israel’s Jewish character, describing it as a reality imposed on Arab citizens, and has supported an Arab-led civic-service arrangement without military ties. At the same time, he opposes the existing national-service framework. These positions offer a possible starting point for negotiations, not a complete political settlement.

There are legitimate questions about Abbas’s refusal to publicly designate Hamas a terrorist organisation. His position can create suspicion among Jewish voters, particularly after October 7. The reported remarks of Ra’am parliamentarian Yasser Hujirat, who described Hamas as having both charitable and political dimensions, have also raised concerns. Such statements deserve direct examination rather than automatic acceptance or dismissal.

A political coalition cannot function if its members are unwilling to condemn attacks on civilians or recognise the basic security concerns of their partners. Equally, no party should be required to abandon its commitment to Palestinian rights as the price of being recognised as a legitimate political participant.

The answer lies in a transparent coalition agreement that establishes common standards: unequivocal opposition to attacks on civilians, rejection of political violence against innocent people, respect for democratic procedures, and a commitment to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a political process that guarantees freedom, security and self-determination.

These principles must be reciprocal. Security cannot become a euphemism for permanent domination, and resistance cannot become a justification for targeting civilians.

The Joint List and Ra’am are distinct political formations, and their participation need not take the same form. A party may join a governing coalition, support a government from outside it, or negotiate agreements on budgets and legislation without assuming ministerial responsibility. These are legitimate parliamentary arrangements. The immediate objective should be to create a government capable of governing responsibly, rather than demand ideological uniformity before negotiations even begin.

Is secular Israel disappearing?

The electoral predicament also raises a difficult question about secularism and the growing influence of religious-nationalist politics.

It would be simplistic to suggest that Israeli society is uniformly religious or that secular Israelis have disappeared. Israel contains diverse political, cultural and religious communities, and its voters do not divide neatly into religious and secular camps. Yet the influence of religious-nationalist and ultra-Orthodox parties has become a structural challenge for governments seeking to balance national identity, public services, military obligations and individual freedoms. The election results also demonstrate the continuing strength of nationalist politics, even as Netanyahu’s bloc has lost seats.

The problem is not religion itself. It is the use of religious identity to determine who belongs, who enjoys political legitimacy and whose national aspirations can be recognised. A genuinely democratic state must protect religious freedom while preventing any religious or ethnic constituency from claiming an exclusive entitlement to political authority.

Secular and liberal Israelis, Arab citizens and religious Jews who support equality may have more common ground than their political leaders acknowledge. They may disagree over theology, national identity and historical narratives, but they can still agree on judicial independence, civil liberties, accountable government and the protection of human life.

The challenge is to translate these shared concerns into a political programme. Without such a programme, secular voters may remain fragmented, Arab citizens may continue to be marginalised, and religious-nationalist parties may retain disproportionate influence over the country’s direction.

The high-stakes gamble Israel must take

Would a Jewish-Arab coalition bring down Israel?

The more pertinent question is whether Israel can preserve its long-term stability without confronting the political exclusions that weaken its democratic legitimacy and perpetuate conflict.

A coalition involving Jewish and Arab parties would not automatically end the occupation, dismantle settlements, resolve the refugee question or produce Palestinian statehood. Nor would it guarantee political stability. The disagreements would be formidable, the public reaction uncertain, and the coalition vulnerable to attacks from those who regard cooperation with Arab representatives as an unacceptable compromise.

Yet political transformation rarely begins when every participant feels comfortable. It begins when the cost of maintaining the existing order becomes greater than the risk of changing it.

Eisenkot and his allies should therefore consider a coalition based on a defined set of priorities: restoring institutional checks and balances, protecting equal citizenship, ending discriminatory practices, addressing the needs of Arab communities, rejecting annexation, restraining settlement expansion, and creating a credible pathway towards Palestinian self-determination. These commitments would need to be negotiated, publicly explained and translated into measurable government action.

A coalition of this kind would not require Jewish and Arab parties to erase their differences. It would require them to accept that their differences must be managed through democratic politics rather than permanent exclusion.

Nor should Arab leaders be expected to bear the entire burden of reconciliation. Jewish politicians must take the political risk of defending their participation. They must challenge the claim that Arab representation threatens the state, and demonstrate that equality strengthens rather than diminishes democratic government.

This is where leadership matters. A politician who merely calculates which coalition will keep him in office is a manager of the existing system. A politician who risks his own political future to widen the boundaries of democratic participation has the potential to change it.

Netanyahu’s possible departure would be significant, but it should not become the sole measure of political renewal. The deeper test is whether the next government can break with the assumption that Jewish political parties alone possess the unquestioned authority to determine Israel’s future.

Coexistence is not a concession. It is the only credible future.

Israel’s political crisis presents a choice between two paths. One leads towards another unstable coalition assembled through familiar ideological compromises, with Arab citizens once again treated as outsiders whose votes are useful but whose participation is unacceptable. The other begins with the recognition that a democratic state cannot indefinitely ask a substantial section of its citizens to remain politically marginalised.

A Jewish-Arab coalition would be a gamble, but so is the continuation of a political order in which every election reproduces the same contradictions. The country cannot expect security through military superiority alone, democratic legitimacy through elections alone, or international acceptance while denying Palestinians a credible future of freedom and self-determination.

Coexistence is not an act of generosity by one community towards another. It is a political necessity founded on equal human dignity. It requires Israelis to recognise the rights of Palestinians, Arab citizens to exercise their full democratic agency, and political leaders on all sides to reject the idea that one people’s security must depend on another people’s permanent subordination.

The 19 seats held by Arab-led parties have created an opening. Whether that opening becomes a historic turning point depends on the courage of those who claim to represent an alternative to Netanyahu.

The question is no longer whether Israel can afford to take the political risk of a Jewish-Arab coalition. It is whether Israel can afford not to.

If its leaders retreat once again into the familiar politics of exclusion, they may succeed in forming another government, but they will have missed an opportunity to redefine the country’s future. If they dare to cross the ideological divide, they could begin the difficult work of building a democracy in which citizenship is not diminished by ethnicity and coexistence is not treated as surrender.

That would not be Israel’s downfall. It could be the beginning of its political renewal—and a necessary step towards a future in which Israelis and Palestinians can live with dignity, freedom and security.